Guide to the Courts

Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the judicial branch as one of the three separate and distinct branches of the federal government. The other two are the legislative and executive branches. The federal courts often are called the guardians of the Constitution because their rulings protect rights and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution. Through fair and impartial judgments, the federal courts interpret and apply the law to resolve disputes. The courts do not make the laws as that is the responsibility of Congress. Nor do the courts have the power to enforce the laws. That is the role of the president and the many executive branch departments and agencies.

The highest federal court in the land is the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court has the authority to invalidate legislation or executive actions which, in the Court’s judgment, conflict with the Constitution. This power of judicial review has given the Court a crucial responsibility for assuring individual rights and maintaining a living Constitution whose broad provisions are continually applied to complicated new situations. While the function of judicial review is not explicitly provided in the Constitution, it had been anticipated before the adoption of that document. Prior to 1789, state courts had already overturned legislative acts that conflicted with state constitutions. Moreover, many of the Founding Fathers expected the Supreme Court to assume this role in regard to the Constitution; Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, for example, had underscored the importance of judicial review in the Federalist Papers, urging adoption of the Constitution. Despite this background, the Court’s power of judicial review was not confirmed until 1803, when it was invoked by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. In this decision, the chief justice asserted that the Supreme Court’s responsibility to overturn unconstitutional legislation was a necessary consequence of its duty to uphold the Constitution. That oath could not be fulfilled any other way.2   U.S. Constitution, Article III

The Founding Fathers considered an independent federal judiciary essential to ensure fairness and equal justice for all citizens of the United States. Judicial independence embodies the concept that judges decide cases fairly, impartially and according to the facts and the law, not according to whim, prejudice, fear, the dictates of other branches of government, or the latest public opinion poll. The Constitution promotes judicial independence in two major ways. First, federal judges, including justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, are appointed for life by the president with the advice and consent of the Senate, and they can be removed from office only through impeachment and conviction by Congress of “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Second, the Constitution provides that the compensation of federal judges "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," which means that neither the president nor Congress can reduce the salary of a federal judge. These two protections help an independent judiciary to decide cases free from popular passion and political influence.

Although the details of the complex web of federal jurisdiction that Congress has given the federal courts is beyond the scope of this brief guide, it is important to understand that there are two main sources of cases coming before the federal courts: “federal question” jurisdiction and “diversity” jurisdiction.

In general, federal courts may decide cases that involve the U.S. government, the U.S. Constitution or federal laws, or controversies between states or between the U.S. and foreign governments. A case that raises such a “federal question” may be filed in federal court.

A case also may be filed in federal court based on the “diversity of citizenship” of the litigants (the individuals participating in the case), such as between citizens of different states, or between U.S. citizens and those of another country. To ensure fairness to the out-of-state litigant, the Constitution provides that such cases may be heard in a federal court (the litigants may also bring these cases in a state court). An important limit to diversity jurisdiction is that only cases involving more than $75,000 in potential damages may be filed in a federal court. Claims below that amount may only be pursued in state court.

Congress has provided specialized tribunals for initial decisions in cases involving certain federal laws. For example, bankruptcy judges in the federal districts oversee the process by which individuals or businesses that can no longer pay their creditors either seek a court supervised liquidation of their assets, or reorganize their financial affairs and work out a plan to pay off their debts. In addition, administrative law judges based within federal agencies make initial decisions in areas as diverse as labor disputes and telecommunications.

Although federal courts are located in every state, they are not the only forum available to potential litigants. In fact, the great majority of legal disputes in American courts are addressed in the separate state court systems. For example, state courts have jurisdiction over virtually all divorce and child custody matters, probate and inheritance issues, real estate questions, and juvenile matters, and they handle most criminal cases, contract disputes, traffic violations, and personal injury cases.

The losing party in the trial court in the federal system normally is entitled to appeal the decision to a federal court of appeals. Similarly, a litigant who is not satisfied with a decision made by a federal administrative agency usually may file a petition for review of the agency decision by a court of appeals. Judicial review in cases involving certain federal agencies or programs (for example, disputes over Social Security benefits) may be obtained first in a district court rather than directly to a court of appeals.

In a civil case either side may appeal the verdict. In a criminal case the defendant may appeal a guilty verdict, but the government may not appeal if a defendant is found not guilty. Either side in a criminal case may appeal with respect to the sentence that is imposed after a guilty verdict.

In most bankruptcy courts, an appeal of a ruling by a bankruptcy judge may be taken to the district court. Several courts of appeals, however, have established a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel consisting of three bankruptcy judges to hear appeals directly from the bankruptcy courts. In either situation, the party that loses in the initial bankruptcy appeal may then appeal to the court of appeals.

A litigant who files an appeal, known as an “appellant,” must show that the trial court or administrative agency made a legal error that affected the decision in the case. The court of appeals makes its decision based on the record of the case established by the trial court or agency. It does not receive additional evidence or hear witnesses. The Court of Appeals also may review the factual findings of the trial court or agency, but typically may only overturn a decision on factual grounds if the findings were “clearly erroneous.”

Appeals are decided by panels of three court of appeals judges working together. The appellant presents his/her legal arguments to the panel in a brief that tries to persuade the judges that the trial court made an error, and that its decision should be reversed. On the other hand, the party defending against the appeal, known as the “appellee,” tries in its brief to show why the trial court decision was correct, or why any error made by the trial court was not significant enough to affect the outcome of the case. Although some cases are decided on the basis of written briefs alone, many cases are selected for an oral argument before the court. Oral argument in the court of appeals is a structured discussion between the appellate lawyers and the panel of judges focusing on the legal principles in dispute. Each side is given a short time (usually about 15 minutes) to present arguments to the court.

The court of appeals decision usually will be the final word in the case, unless it sends the case back to the federal trial court for additional proceedings, or the parties ask the U.S. Supreme Court to review the case. In some cases the decision may be reviewed en banc, that is, by a larger group (usually all) of the court of appeals judges for the circuit.

A litigant who loses in a federal court of appeals, or in the state Supreme Court, may file a petition for a “writ of certiorari,” which is a document asking the Supreme Court to review the case. The Supreme Court, however, does not have to grant review. The Court typically will agree to hear a case only when it involves an unusually important legal principle, or when two or more federal appellate courts have interpreted a law differently. The Supreme Court also has original jurisdiction in a very small number of cases arising out of disputes between states or between a state and the federal government. There are also a small number of special circumstances in which the Supreme Court is required by law to hear an appeal.

The justices must exercise considerable discretion in deciding which cases to hear because more than 7,000 civil and criminal cases are filed in the Supreme Court for consideration each year from the various state and federal courts. When the Supreme Court rules on a constitutional issue, that judgment is virtually final; its decisions can be altered only by the rarely used procedure of constitutional amendment or by a new ruling of the Court. However, when the Court interprets a statute, new legislative action can be taken.

The Federal Courts exist because the Constitution gives Congress the power to create federal courts. The cases heard in federal courts are determined by Congress. Congress determines the number of federal judges and where they work. Through the confirmation hearing process for each federal court judge nominee, Congress determines which of the President's judicial nominees ultimately becomes a federal court judge.

The Hon. Bristow Marchant
The Hon. Thomas E. Rogers, III
The Hon. Paige J. Gossett
The Hon. Shiva V. Hodges
The Hon. Kevin F. McDonald
The Hon. Jacquelyn D. Austin
The Hon. Kaymani D. West
The Hon. Mary Gordon Baker
The Hon. Robert L. Buchanan, Jr. 

The Hon. R. Bryan Harwell
The Hon. David C. Norton
The Hon. Richard M. Gergel
The Hon. J. Michelle Childs
The Hon. Timothy M. Cain
The Hon. Mary Geiger Lewis
The Hon. Bruce H. Hendricks
The Hon. Donald C. Coggins, Jr.
The Hon. G. Ross Anderson, Jr.
The Hon. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
The Hon. Henry M. Herlong, Jr.
The Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie
The Hon. Margaret B. Seymour
The Hon. Terry L. Wooten

The Hon. David R. Duncan, Chief Bankruptcy Judge
The Hon. John E. Waites
The Hon. Helen Elizabeth Burris

The third branch—the court system—has been called the least understood branch of government, but it is also the branch with which the public comes into contact most closely and frequently. At one time or another, the courts touch almost every aspect of life. The courts provide a forum for the peaceful resolution of disputes and they act as referees between people and the government by determining the permissible limits of governmental power and the extent of an individual’s rights and responsibilities.

Every day, in every county in the state of South Carolina, people of many different backgrounds come together at the local courthouse. The business that brings them to the courts is as diverse as the individuals themselves. They are paying traffic tickets, going through divorces, adopting children, airing disputes with their neighbors, settling the estate of a deceased relative, serving on jury duty, volunteering in court-connected programs, and much more.

The court system does not command armies or levy taxes, like the executive and legislative branches, respectively. The sole source of its power to enforce the decisions that judges make is the trust and confidence of the people. To maintain and enhance this trust and confidence, the courts must strive to do justice by applying the law in a fair and equitable manner. This means that judges cannot make up their minds in advance on how they will decide a case based upon a personal bias. They cannot decide cases based upon whim, prejudice, fear, the wishes of the other branches of government, or editorials in the local newspaper. Indeed, judges cannot decide cases based upon anything but the facts in the individual case and the law. This concept—the bedrock of the court system—is called judicial independence.

The laws that judges apply in individual cases are derived from a variety of sources, including the state and federal constitutions, legislative acts (statutes), administrative rules, and the common law, which reflects society’s customs and experience as expressed in previous court decisions. This body of law is constantly changing to meet the needs of an increasingly complex world. The courts have the task of finding the delicate balance between flexibility to accommodate each person’s unique circumstances and stability to protect the fundamental principles of the constitutional system of the United States.

Both state and federal courts have jurisdiction over South Carolina residents. State courts generally handle cases pertaining to state laws, but the federal government may give state courts jurisdiction over specified federal questions. The federal courts in South Carolina handle cases involving violations of federal law and cases involving state law if one party is a South Carolina resident and the other party resides in a different state.

The Supreme Court, the highest court in the state, with five justices who are elected by the General Assembly to 10-year terms. The Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over seven classes of cases. It may, it its discretion, entertain other appeals by way of certiorari, or entertain matters in its original jurisdiction.

Chief Justice Donald W. Beatty
Justice John W. Kittredge
Justice Kaye Hearn
Justice John Cannon Few
Justice George C. James, Jr.

The Court of Appeals, the intermediate appellate court, with nine judges serving six year terms, hears all appeals that are brought to it, and is considered an “error-correcting” court. Cases are heard by panels of three judges or the entire court. Some appeals bypass the court, like death penalty appeals, but most appeals come to the court before proceeding to the Supreme Court.

Chief Judge James Edward Lockemy, 2008
The Hon. Thomas E. Huff, 1996
The Hon. Paul E. Short, Jr., 2004
The Hon. H. Bruce Williams, 2004
The Hon. Paula H. Thomas, 2007
The Hon. Aphrodite K. Konduros, 2008
The Hon. John D. Geathers, 2008
The Hon. Stephanie P. McDonald, 2014
The Hon. D. Garrison Hill, 2017
The Hon. Blake A. Hewitt, 2019

The Circuit Courts, South Carolina’s trial courts, are located in every county in the state. The State is divided into sixteen judicial circuits serving six year terms. Each circuit has at least one resident circuit judge who maintains an office in the judge's home county within the circuit. There are fifty-two circuit judges who serve the sixteen circuits on a rotating basis, with court terms and assignments determined by the Chief Justice based upon recommendations of Court Administration. A final judgment by the Circuit Court can be appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, but in some cases appeals go directly to the South Carolina Supreme Court.

First Circuit (Counties: Calhoun, Dorchester, Orangeburg)
The Hon. Edgar W. Dickson
The Hon. Diane Schafer Goodstein

Second Circuit (Counties: Aiken, Bamberg, Barnwell)
The Hon. Doyet A. Early, III

Third Circuit (Counties: Clarendon, Lee, Sumter, Williamsburg)
The Hon. R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr.
The Hon. Kristi Fisher Curtis

Fourth Circuit (Counties: Chesterfield, Darlington, Dillon, Marlboro)
The Hon. Paul M. Burch
The Hon. Roger E. Henderson

Fifth Circuit (Counties: Richland, Kershaw)
The Hon. DeAndrea G. Benjamin
The Hon. L. Casey Manning
The Hon. Robert E. Hood

Sixth Circuit (Counties: Chester, Fairfield, Lancaster)
The Hon. Brian M. Gibbons

Seventh Circuit (Counties: Cherokee, Spartanburg)
The Hon. J. Mark Hayes, II
The Hon. J. Derham Cole
The Hon Grace Gilchrist Knie

Eighth Circuit (Counties: Abbeville, Greenwood, Laurens, Newberry)
The Hon. Frank R. Addy, Jr.
The Hon. Eugene C. Griffith, Jr.

Ninth Circuit (Counties: Charleston, Berkeley)
The Hon. Deadra L. Jefferson
The Hon. Bentley Price
The Hon. Roger M. Young Sr.

Tenth Circuit (Counties: Anderson, Oconee)
The Hon. R. Lawton McIntosh
The Hon. R. Scott Sprouse

Eleventh Circuit (Counties: Edgefield, Lexington, McCormick, Saluda)
The Hon. William P. Keesley
The Hon. Walton J. McLeod, IV

Twelfth Circuit (Counties: Florence, Marion)
The Hon. Michael G. Nettles

Thirteenth Circuit (Counties: Greenville, Pickens)
The Hon. Perry H. Gravely
The Hon. Letitia H. Verdin
The Hon. Robin B. Stilwell
The Hon. Alex Kinlaw, Jr.

Fourteenth Circuit (Counties: Allendale, Beaufort, Colleton, Hampton, Jasper)
The Hon. Perry McPherson Buckner, III
The Hon. Carmen T. Mullen

Fifteenth Circuit (Counties: Georgetown, Horry)
The Hon. Steven H. John
The Hon. Benjamin H. Culbertson

Sixteenth Circuit (Counties: Union, York)
The Hon. William Angus McKinnon
The Hon. Daniel D. Hall

At Large Seat No. 1 The Hon. George M. McFaddin, Jr.
At Large Seat No. 2 The Hon. R. Markley Dennis, Jr.
At Large Seat No. 3 The Hon. Clifton Newman
At Large Seat No. 4 The Hon. Edward W. Miller
At Large Seat No. 5 The Hon. J. Mark Hayes, II.
At Large Seat No. 6 The Hon. William H. Seals, Jr.
At Large Seat No. 7 The Hon. J. Cordell Maddox, Jr.
At Large Seat No. 8 The Hon. D. Craig Brown
At Large Seat No. 9 The Hon. Jennifer Blanchard McCoy
At Large Seat No. 10 The Hon. Jocelyn Newman
At Large Seat No. 11 The Hon. Alison Renee Lee
At Large Seat No. 12 The Hon. Thomas A. Russo
At Large Seat No. 13 The Hon. Larry B. Hyman, Jr.
At Large Seat No. 14 The Hon. R. Keith Kelly
At Large Seat No. 15 The Hon. Maite' Murphy
At Large Seat No. 16 The Hon. Donald Bruce Hocker

The Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving domestic or family relationships. Pursuant to this provision, the Family Court is the sole forum for the hearing of all cases concerning marriage, divorce, legal separation, custody, visitation rights, termination of parental rights, adoption, support, alimony, division of marital property, and change of name. The Court also generally has exclusive jurisdiction over minors under the age of seventeen alleged to have violated any state law or municipal ordinance. However, most traffic, fish, and game law violations are still triable in the magistrate or municipal courts. Serious criminal charges may be transferred to the Circuit Court. Family Court judges serve six year terms.

First Circuit (Counties: Calhoun, Dorchester, Orangeburg)
The Hon. Anne Gué Jones
The Hon. William J. Wylie, Jr.
The Hon. Nancy C. McLin

Second Circuit (Counties: Aiken, Bamberg, Barnwell)
The Hon. Vicki J. Snelgrove
The Hon. Angela W. Abstance

Third Circuit (Counties: Clarendon, Lee, Sumter, Williamsburg)
The Hon. Thomas Murray Bultman
​The Hon. Gordon B. Jenkinson
The Hon. Angela R. Taylor

Fourth Circuit (Counties: Chesterfield, Darlington, Dillon, Marlboro)
The Hon Cely Anne Brigman
The Hon. Sally Huggins McIntyre
The Hon. Michael S. Holt

Fifth Circuit (Counties: Richland, Kershaw)
The Hon. Dorothy Mobley Jones
The Hon. Michelle Manigault Hurley
The Hon. Dana A. Morris
The Hon Gwendlyne Young Jones

Sixth Circuit (Counties: Chester, Fairfield, Lancaster)
The Hon. Coreen B. Khoury
The Hon. Debra A. Matthews

Seventh Circuit (Counties: Cherokee, Spartanburg)
The Hon. Phillip K. Sinclair
The Hon. James F. Fraley, Jr.
The Hon. Usha J. Bridges

Eighth Circuit (Counties: Abbeville, Greenwood, Laurens, Newberry)
The Hon. Matthew Price Turner
The Hon.  Mindy Westbrook ZImmerman
The Hon. Joseph Collins Smithdeal
Vacant

Ninth Circuit (Counties: Charleston, Berkeley)
The Hon. Daniel E. Martin, Jr.
The Hon. Alice A. Richter
The Hon. Michele Patrao Forsythe
The Hon.Wayne M. Creech
The Hon. Jocelyn B. Cate
The Hon. Jack A. Landis

Tenth Circuit (Counties: Anderson, Oconee)
The Hon. Edger H. Long, Jr.
The Hon. Karen F. Ballenger
The Hon. Tommy B. Edwards

Eleventh Circuit (Counties: Edgefield, Lexington, McCormick, Saluda)
The Hon. W. Greg Seigler
The Hon. Huntley Smith Crouch
The Hon. Robert E. Newton

Twelfth Circuit (Counties: Florence, Marion)
The Hon. Timothy H. Pogue
The Hon. Jerry D. Vinson, Jr.
The Hon. FitzLee H. McEachin

Thirteenth Circuit (Counties: Greenville, Pickens)
The Hon. Rochelle Y. Conits
The Hon. W. Marsh Robertson
The Hon. Katherine H. Tiffany
The Hon. Karen S. Roper
The Hon. Tarita A. Dunbar
The Hon. Jessica Ann Salvini

Fourteenth Circuit (Counties: Allendale, Beaufort, Colleton, Hampton, Jasper)
The Hon. Gerald C. Smoak, Jr.
The Hon. Peter L. Fuge
The Hon. Deborah A. Malphrus

Fifteenth Circuit (Counties: Georgetown, Horry)
The Hon. Jan B. Holmes
The Hon. Melissa Johnson Emery Buckhannon
The Hon. Ronald R. Norton

Sixteenth Circuit (Counties: Union, York)
The Hon. Thomas Henry White, IV
The Hon. David G. Guyton

At Large Seat No. 1 The Hon. Kelly Pope-Black (Expires 7/30/19)
At Large Seat No. 2 The Hon. Tony Miller Jones
At Large Seat No. 3 The Hon. James G. McGee, III
At Large Seat No. 4 The Hon. M'onet S. PIncus
At Large Seat No. 5 The Hon. Randall Edward McGee
At Large Seat No. 6 The Hon. David Earl Phillips
At Large Seat No. 7 The Hon. Thomas Tredway Hodges
At Large Seat No. 8 The Hon. Rosalyn W. Frierson-Smith

The Federal Courts exist because the Constitution gives Congress the power to create federal courts. The cases heard in federal courts are determined by Congress. Congress determines the number of federal judges and where they work. Through the confirmation hearing process for each federal court judge nominee, Congress determines which of the President's judicial nominees ultimately becomes a federal court judge.

South Carolina Federal Court Magistrate Judges
The Hon. Bristow Marchant
The Hon. Thomas E. Rogers, III
The Hon. Paige J. Gossett
The Hon. Shiva V. Hodges
The Hon. Kevin F. McDonald
The Hon. Jacquelyn D. Austin
The Hon. Kaymani D. West
The Hon. Mary Gordon Baker
The Hon. Robert L. Buchanan, Jr. 

South Carolina Federal Court Judges
The Hon. R. Bryan Harwell
The Hon. David C. Norton
The Hon. Richard M. Gergel
The Hon. J. Michelle Childs
The Hon. Timothy M. Cain
The Hon. Mary Geiger Lewis
The Hon. Bruce H. Hendricks
The Hon. Donald C. Coggins, Jr.
The Hon. G. Ross Anderson, Jr.
The Hon. Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
The Hon. Henry M. Herlong, Jr.
The Hon. Cameron McGowan Currie
The Hon. Margaret B. Seymour
The Hon. Terry L. Wooten

The Bankruptcy Courts exist to support the efficient and orderly administration of the bankruptcy process in this Court. The Court's mission is to provide debtors with a fresh start and the resolution of claims in a fair and efficient forum dedicated to excellent public service.

South Carolina Federal Bankruptcy Court Judges
The Hon. David R. Duncan, Chief Bankruptcy Judge
The Hon. John E. Waites
The Hon. Helen Elizabeth Burris

The Bankruptcy Courts exist to support the efficient and orderly administration of the bankruptcy process in this Court. The Court's mission is to provide debtors with a fresh start and the resolution of claims in a fair and efficient forum dedicated to excellent public service.

South Carolina Federal Bankruptcy Court Judges
The Hon. David R. Duncan, Chief Bankruptcy Judge
The Hon. John E. Waites
The Hon. Helen Elizabeth Burris

In addition to the courts themselves, there are other entities that are part of the court system. Other parts of the court system include the register of deeds in each county, probate judges, the clerks of court, circuit court judges, magistrates court and masters-in-equity. The shared concern of these parts of the judiciary of South Carolina is to provide the state's citizens with an adequate, thorough, and fair judicial system. To learn more about each of these entities, consult the state judicial website at www.sccourts.org.

South Carolina Court System - Handout

The South Carolina Supreme Court is the state’s highest court. Five justices make up the Court. They are elected to 10-year terms by the General Assembly.

As South Carolina’s court of last resort, the Supreme Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over seven classes of case appeals and has discretion to entertain other appeals. The Supreme Court may also hear cases that have not been heard in a lower court, known as original jurisdiction actions. In addition to its case-deciding function, the Supreme Court has administrative and regulatory authority over all South Carolina courts and the practice of law in the state. The Chief Justice, who is chosen by the General Assembly, is the administrative head of the judicial system and exercises administrative authority according to procedures adopted by the Supreme Court and General Assembly

The South Carolina Supreme Court provides litigants with a resolution of the matter from the highest court in the state and interprets and develops the law of this state. The Supreme Court's published decisions serve as binding precedent on all other courts in this state and, therefore, serve as a framework for how cases will be decided in the future, providing stability and predictability in the law.

In its original jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may allow actions to be commenced in the Supreme Court and may issue mandamus, certiorari, and other extraordinary writs. Normally, this only occurs when the case involves significant public interest or other unusual circumstances. Finally, the Supreme Court can agree to answer questions of law certified to it by a federal court or the highest court of another state when South Carolina law may be determinative of the action pending in the other jurisdiction.

In its appellate capacity, it has exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Circuit Court which includes a sentence of death; a Circuit Court order setting a public utility rate; a judgment involving a constitutional challenge to a state statute or local ordinance; a judgment of the Circuit Court involving public bond indebtedness; a judgment of the Circuit Court pertaining to an election; an order limiting the investigation by a State Grand Jury; and an order of the Family Court relating to an abortion by a minor. Additionally, on its own motion or a motion of a party or the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court may certify an appeal pending before the Court of Appeals for decision by the Supreme Court.

The South Carolina Constitution outlines the development of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Article V, § 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 as follows:
 

ARTICLE V.
THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

SECTION 1. Judicial power vested in certain courts.
The judicial power shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law. (1985 Act No. 9, eff February 26, 1985.)

SECTION 2. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Justice and four Associate Justices, any three of whom shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. The Chief Justice shall preside, and in his absence the senior Associate Justice. In all cases decided by the Supreme Court, the concurrence of three of the Justices shall be necessary for a reversal of the judgment below. (1985, Act No. 9, eff February 26, 1985.)

SECTION 3. Election of members of Supreme Court.
The members of the Supreme Court shall be elected by a joint public vote of the General Assembly for a term of ten years, and shall continue in office until their successors shall be elected and qualified, and shall be classified so that the term of one of them shall expire every two years. In any contested election, the vote of each member of the General Assembly present and voting shall be recorded. (1985 Act No. 9, eff February 26, 1985.)

SECTION 4. Powers of Chief Justice; rules; admission to practice of law and discipline of persons admitted.
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the administrative head of the unified judicial system. He shall appoint an administrator of the courts and such assistants as he deems necessary to aid in the administration of the courts of the State. The Chief Justice shall set the terms of any court and shall have the power to assign any judge to sit in any court within the unified judicial system. Provided, each county shall be entitled to four weeks of court each year and such terms therefor shall be provided for by the General Assembly. Provided, further, that the Chief Justice shall set a term of at least one week in any court of original jurisdiction in any county within sixty days after receipt by him of a resolution of the county bar requesting it. The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all the courts of the State. Subject to the statutory law, the Supreme Court shall make rules governing the practice and procedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction over the admission to the practice of law and the discipline of persons admitted. (1985 Act No. 9, eff February 26, 1985.)

SECTION 4A. Submission of Supreme Court rules to judiciary committees; disapproval by General Assembly.
All rules and amendments to rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of this State promulgated by the Supreme Court must be submitted by the Supreme Court to the Judiciary Committee of each House of the General Assembly during a regular session, but not later than the first day of February during each session. Such rules or amendments shall become effective ninety calendar days after submission unless disapproved by concurrent resolution of the General Assembly, with the concurrence of three fifths of the members of each House present and voting. (1985 Act No. 8, eff February 26, 1985.)

SECTION 5. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court shall have power to issue writs or orders of injunction, mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and other original and remedial writs. The Court shall have appellate jurisdiction only in cases of equity, and in such appeals they shall review the findings of fact as well as the law, except in cases where the facts are settled by a jury and the verdict not set aside. The Supreme Court shall constitute a court for the correction of errors at law under such regulations as the General Assembly may prescribe. (1985 Act No. 9, eff February 26, 1985.)

Beyond deciding cases, the Supreme Court administers the entire South Carolina court system. In this capacity, the Court works to ensure that the South Carolina court system operates fairly and efficiently. The Court’s administrative role has many facets, including:

The Chief Justice, as the administrative head of the Judicial Branch, is responsible for administering the courts, setting the terms of court and assigning judges to preside at those terms.

Budgeting for the entire unified judicial system.
Long-range planning to chart the future of the state courts to ensure the expeditious handling of judicial matters.
Adopting rules to simplify proceedings and promote the speedy and fair resolution of disputes.
Setting standards for security, facilities, and staffing for courthouses throughout the state.
Developing standards to ensure that jurors are treated well and that their time is not wasted.
Identifying appropriate ways to use court-connected alternative dispute resolution (for example, a mediator might help disputing parties come to their own resolution), which may be less costly for consumers and may improve consumer satisfaction with the justice system.

Another important function of the Supreme Court is to regulate the legal profession and the conduct of the judiciary in South Carolina.

The Office of Bar Admissions is responsible for processing applications of individuals seeking admission to practice law in South Carolina. Additionally, it processes requests to be certified as lead counsel in death penalty cases, requests for approval of trial experiences required before a lawyer may appear alone in the trial of a case, applications for out-of-state attorneys to appear in South Carolina courts pro hac vice, and requests for certificates of good standing for members of the South Carolina Bar who are seeking to be admitted in other states. Finally, it assists the Board of Law Examiners in conducting the South Carolina Bar Examination and assists the Committee on Character and Fitness as it determines whether each applicant has the requisite character to be a member of the South Carolina Bar. The Board of Law Examiners and the Committee on Character and Fitness ensure that lawyers have the requisite legal knowledge, skills, and character to competently and ethically handle the legal affairs of the citizens of South Carolina. The Court's Commission on Continuing Legal Education and Specialization monitors lawyers’ compliance with South Carolina's continuing legal education requirements.

The Rules of Professional Responsibility and the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement govern the conduct of attorneys in the state while the Code of Judicial Conduct and Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement govern judges’ conduct. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel investigates and prosecutes complaints involving allegations of misconduct or incapacity on the part of lawyers licensed to practice law in South Carolina and of judges who are part of the state unified judicial system. Matters handled by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel are filed with and processed through either the Commission on Lawyer Conduct or the Commission on Judicial Conduct. Matters not directly decided by either of these commissions are decided by the Supreme Court. The purpose of the disciplinary system is to protect citizens from attorneys or judges who, because of flaws in their character or skills or because of mental or physical incapacity, could pose a danger to the public if they are allowed to continue practicing law or presiding over court proceedings.

A primary function of the Supreme Court is to ensure independent, open, fair, and efficient resolution of disputes in accordance with the federal and state constitutions and laws. Cases come to the Supreme Court in a number of ways:

A party who has lost a case in the Court of Appeals may file a petition for review.
Any party may ask the Supreme Court to bypass the Court of Appeals and take a case.
The Court of Appeals may ask the Supreme Court to take a case by certification, which means that the Court of Appeals received an appeal of a case, but because that court believed the case met the Supreme Court’s criteria for accepting a case asked the Supreme Court to take the case directly.
A party may begin a case of statewide significance in the Supreme Court (these are called original jurisdiction actions).

In an average year, the South Carolina Supreme Court receives approximately 1,700 petitions for review. These are requests from individuals, groups, businesses, agencies, and others that the Court hear a case.

The Court holds a Conference twice a month to decide which cases it will review. The Court considers the petition for a writ of certiorari, the return filed by the respondent and the record of the lower court proceedings in each case. The criteria a case must meet in order to be heard by the South Carolina Supreme Court are set out in South Carolina Appellate Court Rule 226. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Supreme Court's discretion or power to grant review in general, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:
(1) Where there are novel questions of law.
(2) Where there is a dissent in the decision of the Court of Appeals.
(3) Where the decision of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court.
(4) Where substantial constitutional issues are directly involved.
(5) Where a federal question is included and the decision of the Court of Appeals conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court.
Because the Supreme Court has absolute discretion to decide which cases it hears, a case may meet none of the above criteria and yet the Court may choose to hear it.

When the Court agrees to decide a case, the parties are asked to file written arguments, called briefs. Once the briefs are filed, the case is assigned to a justice and set for oral argument. Oral argument is to the Supreme Court what a trial is to a Circuit Court. But unlike a trial, oral argument does not involve the presentation of evidence or witnesses because the facts of the case are no longer in question (they were established in the lower courts). Instead, oral argument consists of carefully timed presentations by attorneys for each party. The time allotted for presentation of cases varies according to the complexity of the case; however, in most cases, each side is allowed ten minutes to present their argument and the appellant or petitioner is allowed an additional five minutes for reply or rebuttal. Parties may request additional time for oral argument, but this is rare.

After the cases are assigned, each justice’s law clerk prepares an in-depth memorandum on those cases assigned to his/her justice. The purpose of the memorandum is to research and analyze the issues in the case. Prior to oral argument, each justice receives a copy of the memorandum.

The attorneys may use their time to clarify the arguments set forth in the briefs or discuss developments in applicable law which have occurred subsequent to the filing of the briefs.
During the presentation, the justices ask questions of the attorneys.

The attorney for the appellant or petitioner (the party seeking review of the lower court decision) is the first to speak. The Clerk of Court for the Supreme Court monitors the time for the attorney’s oral argument by the use of a timer on the podium. Generally, ten minutes is allotted for initial argument and five minutes for rebuttal. When the time reserved for argument has expired, attorneys are generally to terminate their arguments immediately. However, if the court has asked a number of questions, the Chief Justice will often give the attorney additional time to complete the argument.

The attorney for the respondent, the party who won in the lower court, speaks next, and the same procedure is followed. The only difference is that the attorney for the respondent does not get to make a rebuttal.

The attorney for the appellant or petitioner then takes the podium for a five-minute rebuttal.

Oral arguments are audio recorded live and are available on the SC ETV website at https://www.scetv.org/live/supreme-court-south-carolina. The website includes a schedule of the planned cases along with a listing of archived cases.

Following each day’s oral arguments, the Court meets in closed conference. The assigned justice gives his/her analysis and recommendation, the Court discusses the case, and each member of the Court casts a preliminary vote, usually in descending order of seniority and beginning with the justice who has given the recommendation. When possible, the Court reaches a decision in each of the cases argued that day, but any decision is tentative until the opinion is issued.

Immediately after the Court reaches its tentative decision in a case, the assigned justice prepares an opinion.

After the justices agree on an opinion, it is issued, or filed with the Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, and made available to the parties in the case and to the public. Every opinion is posted to the South Carolina Judicial Department website when issued. All concurring and dissenting opinions are simultaneously issued. Until a decision is issued, any justice may reconsider his or her vote on the case.

South Carolina Supreme Court opinions are officially published in South Carolina Reports.

Reconsideration, in the sense of a re-hearing of a case, is seldom granted. A change of decision on reconsideration will ensue only when the Court has overlooked controlling legal precedent or important policy considerations or has overlooked or misconstrued a controlling or significant fact appearing in the record.

There have been many cases decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court over the years. Below are a number of important cases decided by the South Carolina Supreme Court that have had an impact on the state. All but two of the cases have been determined since 1969.

Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of S.C. v. Episcopal Church, 421 S.C. 211, 806 S.E. 2d 82 (2017). This case decided the issue of whether proeprty was owned by a disassociated diocese of the Protestant Episcopal Church or The Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States of America, which is the national church. A divided Supreme Court ruled the church property belonged to the national church. A petition for writ of certiorari to review the opinion is currently pending in the United States Supreme Court.
http://www.sccourts.org/opinions/HTMLFiles/SC/27731.pdf 

Harrell v. Attorney General of State of South Carolina, 409 SC 60 (2014). Private citizen brought complaint to House Ethics Committee alleging ethical violations by the Speaker of the SC House of Representatives, Robert Harrell. Question for the Supreme Court was whether a referral from the House Ethics Committee was required before the Attorney General, Alan Wilson, could initiate a criminal investigation/impanelling state grand jury. Supreme Court found that no referral from the House Ethics Committee was necessary for the AG to bring the investigation. However, it was remanded to determine if Alan Wilson should be disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. 

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013): A non-Native American couple in South Carolina sought to adopt a young Cherokee girl over the objections of her Cherokee father who asserted his parental rights. The child was initially placed with the South Carolina family by the birth mother. The South Carolind Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the South Carolina Family Court which applied the Indian Child Welfare Act and transferred physical and legal custody of the child to her biological fatehr. By a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court decision and remanded the case for further hearings to determine who should have custody of Baby Girl. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act provisions on active efforts to prevent the breakup of a Native American family and heightened burden of proof for termination of parental rights did not apply to this private adoption proceeding. The United States Supreme Court also held that the section of the Indian Child Welfare Act that deals with adoptive placement preferences did not preclude adoption by prospective non-Native American adoptive parents where no individuals within the Act's placement preferences had formally sought to adopt the child. The child was ultimately adopted by the South Carolina couple.


Ahrens v. South Carolina, 392 S.C. 340, 709 S.E.2d. 54 (2011): Working retirees who chose to return to work for the State after retiring brought this case challenging the requirement that they make employee contributions to the Retirement Systems. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the forms signed by the working retirees indicating that they would not be required to make contributions did not create a contract between the State and the retiree. The Court determined that the statutes that initially allowed retired members to return to work without making contributions could be amended to require the working retirees to make such contributions. As a result, the State Retirement Systems will continue to collect and retain employee contributions from working retirees. http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=26966

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 180 L.Ed.2d 452 (2011): An indigent father appeared in family court without a lawyer for failing to pay child support. The judge held the father in contempt and sentenced him to 12 months in jail unless he paid the nearly $6,000 arrearage. The father appealed, arguing that he had a constitutional right to an appointed lawyer before being sentenced to one-year imprisonment for civil contempt. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the father did not have a constitutional right to a lawyer because he could avoid the sentence by paying his outstanding child support. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the South Carolina Supreme Court’s ruling and remanded the case. The United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause did not require provision of counsel at the father’s civil contempt proceeding, but in this case, the father’s incarceration did violate the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause does not automatically require the provision of counsel in this type of proceeding even though the father faced incarceration for up to one year. In particular the Due Process Clause does not require the provision of counsel where the opposing party to whom support funds are owed is not represented by counsel and South Carolina provides alternative procedural safeguards that are the equivalent to adequate notice of the importance of his ability to pay, fair opportunity to present, and to dispute relevant information, and court findings. This father’s Due Process rights were violated because he did not receive either counsel or the benefit of alternative procedural safeguards such as clear notice that his ability to pay would constitute the critical question in his contempt proceeding, a form, or the equivalent, designed to gather information about this financial circumstances, and a court finding that he was able to pay his arrearage.
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/10pdf/10-10.pdf

Seagars-Andrews v. Judicial Merit Selection Comm’n, 387 S.C. 109, 691 S.E.2d 453 (2010): Pursuant to the South Carolina constitution, justices and judges are elected by the General Assembly. The Judicial Merit Selection Commission (JMSC) is charged with evaluating the qualifications and fitness of all judicial candidates for election and re-election. Only candidates found to be qualified by the JMSC can be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration. This opinion established that the South Carolina Supreme Court could not intervene in decisions made by the JMSC absent an unconstitutional exercise by the JMSC of its powers. To intervene in the JMSC’s decisions would violate separation of powers. 

Sanford v. South Carolina State Ethics Comm’n, 385 S.C. 483, 685 S.E.2d 600 (2009): A writ of mandamus can be issued by the Supreme Court to enforce a legal right. Governor Sanford petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the State Ethics Commission to comply with statute and regulations regarding confidentiality. The Governor asserted that the State Ethics Commission should not be permitted to publicly disseminate any investigatory reports about its ethics complaints against the Governor. The Speaker of the House also petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the State Ethics Commission to issues all of its investigations materials. The Supreme Court denied the petitions and did not issue the writs because neither the Governor nor the Speaker of the House met the requirements for a mandamus. 

Whaley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 362 S.C. 456, 609 S.E.2d 286 (2005): This opinion clarifies where venue is proper or where an action may be brought when a corporation is the defendant. 

Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 593 S.E.2d 470 (2004): In one of many cases brought by Edward Sloan, a concerned taxpayer/citizen, the Supreme Court held that a constitutional provision which prohibits the Governor from holding "any office or other Commission (except in the militia) under the authority of this State, or of any other power" does not prohibit the Governor from serving in the Air Force Reserve. 

State ex rel. Condon v. Hodges, 349 S.C. 232, 562 S.E.2d 623 (2002): Established when the Attorney General is authorized to bring an action against the Governor. 

Simmons v. Tuomey Regional Med. Ctr., 341 S.C. 32, 533 S.E.2d 312 (2000): Imposes a nondelegable duty on hospitals with regard to physicians who practice in their emergency rooms. 

Drummond v. Beasley, 331 S.C. 559, 503 S.E.2d 455 (1998): This case is one of a number of cases that have come to the South Carolina Supreme Court focusing on the Governor’s veto power. This particular case established that the Governor may only veto those parts of legislation labeled by the legislature as items or sections and may return vetoes with multiple items or sub-items included within a single objection in appropriation bills. 

Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777 (1997), cert. denied 523 U.S. 1145, 118 S.Ct. 1857, 140 L.Ed.2d 1104 (1998): In this controversial case, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a viable fetus is a "child" within the meaning of the child abuse and endangerment statute, and therefore the mother could be charged under the statute for ingesting crack cocaine during the third trimester of pregnancy, causing the baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its system. 

American Heart Ass’n v. County of Greenville, 331 S.C. 498, 489 S.E.2d 921 (1997): In a dispute over the will of “Shoeless Joe” Jackson, a famous professional baseball player, the Court held the will was public record and subject to retention by the County or State; therefore, Mrs. Jackson could not pass ownership of the will to a charity. 

Silverman v. Campbell, 326 S.C. 208, 486 S.E.2d 1 (1997): In this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Article VI, section 2 (“No person who denies the existence of the Supreme Being shall hold any office under this Constitution) and Article XVII, section 4 (“No person who denies the existence of a Supreme Being shall hold any office under this Constitution) of the South Carolina Constitution violated the First Amendment and the Religious Test of the United States Constitution by barring persons who denied the existence of a “Supreme Being” from holding office. At that time, only two states, North Carolina and South Carolina, required a religious test for public office. 

In the Matter of (Twila) Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 471 S.E.2d 462 (1995): This opinion upheld a finding of contempt against a reporter for The State newspaper who refused to reveal a confidential source who had provided information for an article on a pending murder trial. 

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 309 S.C. 424, 424 S.E.2d 484 (1992): This opinion and its predecessor, which was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991), reviewed by 505 U.S. 1003, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992), address compensation of property owners affected by the Beachfront Management Act. 

Ex parte Island Packet, 308 S.C. 198, 417 S.E.2d 575 (1992): This opinion addresses the public’s First Amendment right of access and when denial of access through the closure of court proceedings in a criminal case is appropriate. 

Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 303 S.C. 243, 399 S.E.2d 783 (1991): The South Carolina Supreme Court abrogated the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of comparative negligence for all causes of action arising on or after July 1, 1991. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence, negligence by the plaintiff does not automatically bar recovery by the plaintiff, provided his negligence is not greater than that of the defendant. 

State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979): In this opinion, the South Carolina Supreme Court found the current statutory death penalty procedure constitutional. In 1976, in State v. Rumsey, 267 S.C. 236, 226 S.E.2d 894 (1976), the Court had found the earlier version of the statute, which provided for mandatory imposition of the death penalty upon a finding of murder committed in specified circumstances, was unconstitutional. 

Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969): South Carolina’s leading products liability case, credited with “starting the tort liability revolution.” 

Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933): Established the “Tyger River Doctrine” under which an insured can bring a bad faith claim against an insurer for refusal to settle a claim within policy limits. 

The South Carolina Court of Appeals began operation in the fall of 1983. Its creation by the South Carolina General Assembly arose from the perception that the state Supreme Court was suffering under an unmanageable backlog of appeals. As a result, appellate litigants were enduring long delays before their cases could reach finality in the Supreme Court.

The Court of Appeals began as a statutory court. In 1984, South Carolina voters approved a proposed amendment to make the Court of Appeals a constitutional court. In 1985, the General Assembly ratified the amendment, thus placing the authority for the Court of Appeals within the South Carolina Constitution.

The Court of Appeals had come into existence as a six-member court and until 1996 received all its cases on assignment from the Supreme Court, where appeals continued to be filed and docketed. In 1996, the General Assembly increased the number of Court of Appeals judges to nine and accepted rules changes that directed the filing of appeals in the Court of Appeals, rather than in the Supreme Court.

The nine members of the South Carolina Court of Appeals sit in panels of three judges, and the action of a panel is the action of the Court. In rare instances of exceptional importance, the Chief Judge and the eight Associate Judges may sit en banc, that is, as one full court of nine judges.

The Court of Appeals judges are elected by the General Assembly to six-year terms.

The Court of Appeals is based in Columbia, but is authorized to hear cases in any county in the state. Under this authority, the Court regularly schedules terms of Court in other counties.

The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is appellate only; that is, a case must originate elsewhere, such as in Circuit Court, and be brought to the Court of Appeals by a notice of appeal in the manner prescribed by the Appellate Court Rules.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to consider appeals in all but a few categories of cases. Chief among these excluded categories are death-penalty appeals, which are within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

All Court of Appeals judges are elected to six-year terms by the General Assembly. Terms of office are staggered so that stability of the court is maintained.

A single judge of the Court of Appeals may rule on a motion filed during the course of an appeal. Only a panel of three judges, or the Court en banc, may decide the merits of an appeal.

After a case is fully briefed, it is assigned by the Clerk’s Office to a panel of judges for consideration, with one judge given primary responsibility for producing the eventual written decision. These judges may decide to hold oral argument, but may also decide that the case does not require oral argument. If the judges decide the case does not require oral argument, the case is submitted, that is, taken under consideration without oral argument.

The Court issues a written decision in each appeal. These decisions are commonly known as opinions. A decision must address all points raised, except those points that the Court determines are manifestly without merit. In the great majority of cases, a decision by the Court of Appeals will be issued within 45 days of hearing or submission. No specific deadline is imposed on the Court of Appeals for the issuance of its opinions.

Decisions are of two kinds: published and unpublished. This terminology can be misleading, because both kinds of opinion actually are published, in that they are made public. In legal terms, however, the denotation “Published” means that the decision receives wide distribution, is printed in the official reports of the Court, and, most significantly, stands as precedent for future decisions. A decision that stands as precedent serves as guidance to judges, lawyers, and others in understanding and interpreting the law of South Carolina. By contrast, decisions denominated “Unpublished” do no more than declare the rights of the parties in the particular case being decided. They have no precedential value, and the Appellate Court Rules strictly prohibit any attempt to cite these unpublished decisions as precedent.

The decision to issue a published or unpublished opinion is committed to the panel issuing the decision. Generally, an opinion that decides a case by applying clear and settled principles of law will not be a published decision.

Following the issuance of a decision, a litigant may petition for rehearing. The petition for rehearing is presented to the same panel that issued the decision. That panel reviews the points raised in the petition for rehearing. If the petition for rehearing is granted, the panel may schedule oral argument. As an alternative, the panel may reconsider the case without oral argument and issue a new opinion.

If the petition for rehearing is denied, the party may petition the Supreme Court and ask it to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Chief Judge James E. Lockemy, 2008
The Hon. Paul E. Short, Jr., 2004
The Hon. H. Bruce Williams, 2004
The Hon. Paula H. Thomas, 2007
The Hon. Aphrodite K. Konduros, 2008
The Hon. John D. Geathers, 2008
The Hon. Stephanie P. McDonald 2014
The Hon. D. Garrison Hill, 2017

The South Carolina Constitution of 1895, as amended, creates a Circuit Court which operates as the only trial court of general jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters within the state.

The state’s 52 circuit judges sit in sixteen (16) circuits, which are constitutionally made up of individual counties. The circuits vary in size from two to five counties. Thirty-three (33) of the judges are resident judges of their particular circuits, while thirteen (13) are at-large, elected from anywhere in the state.

Each circuit has a chief judge for administrative purposes appointed by the Chief Justice of the South Carolina Supreme Court. The chief judge supervises and directs the administrative matters of the circuit, assisted by the Clerk of Court and his or her staff.

Overall direction and management of the court system are handled by the Chief Justice, and managed by the Director of the South Carolina Court Administration, and his or her staff. They work with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit judges, and all other judges in the state to continually assess the management of the trial courts, implement Supreme Court policies, and assist in policy development.

The South Carolina Constitution requires that circuit judges have a minimum of eight (8) years experience as a licensed lawyer in South Carolina. Judges are elected by the legislature for six-year terms, after a rigorous screening procedure.

Retired judges and justices are allowed to sit as active judges, on approval of the Chief Justice, and subject to the screening procedure of the legislature. They exercise all powers of a sitting active judge.

The Clerks of Court are independently elected by the public, and are constitutional officers who work under the supervision of the circuit judges and Chief Justice. They serve four-year terms and run for election on party tickets in general and primary elections. They provide vital management, administrative, and record-keeping functions in each circuit.

The Circuit Court operations are funded by a combination of county and state funds. State funds pay the salaries of the judges, official court reporters, and other staff members. The state also funds travel and training for the judges. The counties are responsible for all other costs.

Circuit judges hear civil cases valued over $7,500 and criminal cases carrying over sixty (60) day penalties. They also hear all motions related to these cases, post-conviction relief matters, and appeals from most of the specific-jurisdiction courts, such as magistrates, probate courts, etc.

There is a great deal of variation among the states in the methodology of selecting judges. The following is a breakdown of the different judicial selection methodologies: twelve states select judges through nonpartisan elections; eight states select judges by partisan elections; fifteen states select judges by way of a nominating commission; nine states select judges by some form of merit selection and other methods; four states select judges by gubernatorial appointment; and, only two states - Virginia and South Carolina - select judges by legislative appointment. What makes South Carolina truly unique is the fact that a judicial candidate must first be nominated by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission before an appointment is made by the legislature.

While partisan and nonpartisan selection is appealing for its democratic value, it does not necessarily ensure that candidates are the most qualified to serve as a judge. At the other end of the spectrum are nominating commissions and merit selection. While such methods may yield very qualified judges, the citizens of the state have little input. South Carolina’s methodology combines the two methodologies - limiting candidates to those who are qualified and providing for ultimate selection by elected representatives.

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission (“Commission”) consists of ten members. Six of those members are also current Members of the General Assembly - three Senators and three Representatives. In addition, the Commission also has four non-legislative members. The purpose of the Commission is to screen candidates for judicial office and report its findings to the General Assembly.

The Judicial Merit Selection Commission is also concerned that since the decisions of our judiciary play such an important role in people’s personal and professional lives that all South Carolinians should have a voice in the selection of those judges. It is this desire for broad-based grassroots participation that has led to the statutory creation (§ 2-19-120) of the Citizens Committees on Judicial Qualifications (“Committees”). These Committees, composed of people from across the societal spectrum, are asked to report to the Commission on the judicial candidates in their region. The reports are based upon interviews conducted by Committee members with people who know the judicial candidates personally and professionally. The Committees’ input guides the Commission’s investigation of judicial candidates.

While the law provides that the Commission is to make findings as to qualifications, the Commission views its role as also including an obligation to consider candidates in the context of the judiciary on which, if elected, they will serve and, to some degree, govern. To that end, the Commission inquires as to the quality of justice delivered in the courtrooms of South Carolina and seeks to impart, through its questioning, the view of the public it represents as to matters of judicial temperament, concern for an informed bench, and the absoluteness of the Judicial Canons as to recusal for conflict of interest, prohibition of ex parte communication, and the disallowance of the acceptance of gifts. The commission also seeks to impart its view that good temperament is an essential quality of a judge.

When the Commission receives notice that an individual intends to seek election or reelection as a judge, the Commission conducts a thorough investigation of the candidate. The Commission’s investigation focuses on the evaluative criteria provided by law which include:

1. Integrity and impartiality;
2. Legal knowledge and ability;
3. Professional experience;
4. Judicial temperament;
5. Diligence and industry;
6. Mental and physical capabilities;
7. Financial responsibility;
8. Public service; and
9. Ethics.

Only candidates found qualified by the Commission can be nominated for judicial office. The Commission compiles the information received on each candidate and submits a Draft Report on Judicial Qualifications to the General Assembly. Forty-eight hours after the Draft Report is issued, it becomes final and candidates can then seek support of General Assembly members. The Senate and the House of Representatives elect justices to serve on the Supreme Court, and judges to the Court of Appeals, to the Administrative Law Judge Division, to the Circuit Court, and to the Family Court. Legislative delegations confirm the gubernatorial appointments of Masters-in-Equity.

Supreme Court
According to Article V, Section 3 of the S.C. Constitution, the members of the South Carolina Supreme Court must be elected by a joint public vote of the General Assembly. In any contested election, the vote of each Member of the General Assembly present and voting must be recorded. According to Article V, Section 27 of the S.C. Constitution, candidates for the Supreme Court must first be screened and found qualified by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission prior to being presented for election by the General Assembly. The five justices are arranged and elected by seat. Candidates can be from any geographical region in the State.

Court of Appeals
According to Article V, Section 8 of the S.C. Constitution, the members of the South Carolina Court of Appeals shall be elected by a joint public vote of the General Assembly. In any contested election, the vote of each Member of the General Assembly present and voting must be recorded. According to Article V, Section 27 of the S.C. Constitution, candidates for the Court of Appeals must first be screened and found qualified by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission prior to being presented for election by the General Assembly. The nine judges of the Court of Appeals are arranged and elected by seat. Candidates can be from any geographical region in the State.

Circuit Court
According to Article V, Section 13 of the S.C. Constitution, the General Assembly must divide the State into judicial circuits. For each circuit, judges must be elected by a joint public vote of the General Assembly. According to Article V, Section 27 of the S.C. Constitution, candidates for Circuit Court judge must first be screened and found qualified by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission prior to being presented for election by the General Assembly. There are sixteen judicial circuits.

Family Court
According to § 2-19-80 of the S.C. Code of Laws, Family Court judges are elected by a joint public vote of the General Assembly. Additionally, candidates for the Family Court must first be screened and found qualified by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission prior to being presented for election by the General Assembly. The required number of family judges and resident family judges in each of the sixteen circuits differs. These requirements are outlined in § 20-7-1410. Currently there are 64 Family Court judges.

Administrative Law Division
According to §1-23-500, the South Carolina Administrative Law Court (ALC) is an agency of the executive branch of the South Carolina government. The ALC consists of six administrative law judges. According to §1-23-510(a) of the S.C. Code of Laws, the judges of the ALC must be elected by the General Assembly in joint session. According to §1-23-510(c), candidates for the Administrative Law Court must be screened and found qualified by the Judicial Merit Selection Commission prior to being presented for election by the General Assembly. Administrative Law Judges are arranged and elected according to seat. Candidates can be from any geographical region in the State.

Master-in-Equity
According to §14-11-20, Masters-in-Equity must be appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the General Assembly. According to §2-19-110, upon a vacancy in the office of Master in Equity, candidates must submit an application to the Judicial Merit Selection Commission. Upon completion of reports and recommendations, the Commission shall submit such reports and recommendations on Master in Equity candidates to the appropriate county legislative delegations. The county legislative delegations shall then submit the name of a candidate to the Governor for consideration for appointment. However, nothing prevents the Governor from rejecting the person nominated by the delegation. In that event, the delegation shall submit another name for consideration. No person found not qualified by the Commission may be appointed to the office of Master in Equity.

Magistrates Court
According to Article V, Section 26 of the S.C. Constitution, magistrates are appointed for each county by the Governor, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. Recommendations for magistrates are given to the Governor by the county senatorial delegation. On and after July 1, 2001, persons seeking a magistrate position must pass an eligibility test, unless exempted, and must have at least two years education beyond a high school degree. On and after July 1, 2005, persons applying to be a magistrate must have a baccalaureate degree.

Municipal Court
According to §14-25-15 of the S.C. Code of Laws, the municipal council appoints each municipal judge.

Probate Court
According to §14-23-30 of the S.C. Code of Laws, Probate Court judges must be elected by the qualified electors of the respective counties for a term of four years. The election for such offices shall be held at each alternative general election, reckoning from the year 1890.

In recent years the method that South Carolina uses to elect judges has come under fire for two reasons; 1) the number of African Americans and women elected to judicial positions has remained low compared to the percentage of African Americans and women in the state’s population; and 2) the election of judges by the General Assembly prevents the judiciary from being totally independent of the legislature. Controversy erupts each year when the judges elected by the General Assembly are primarily white and male, even though the Judicial Merit Selection Commission certifies both African Americans and women as qualified to serve as judges in the various courts of the state. Frustration over the lack of qualified African American and female candidates to the judicial positions has led to friction between members of the General Assembly, even to the point of physical confrontation.
How should the situation be handled? Should a selection process be implemented that requires the General Assembly to elect a certain percentage of African Americans and/or women as judges each year? Or, should the South Carolina constitution be amended to provide for appointment of judges by the governor with the consent of the state senate? Or should the South Carolina Constitution be amended to allow judges to be elected by the people?
Another issue that is debated in South Carolina from time to time regarding the judiciary is whether judges should be appointed for good behavior, like judges of the Federal Courts. Benjamin Tillman, the chief architect of the present South Carolina Constitution, was adamantly against the appointment of judges for good behavior (essentially life). But, if judges do not have to be concerned with reelection, whether by the General Assembly or the people, will they be more active in enforcing the laws of the state?

What do you think? Better yet, what do your students think?

What can students and teachers do at the courts?
There are many learning opportunities awaiting students at South Carolina's federal and state courts. Students might sit in on a trial; meet with a judge, attorney, or clerk of court; and/or tour the courthouse to learn more about all of the offices and agencies involved in a case before it comes to court.

Some suggested activities are:

Observe a trial: Often there will be a court session when students are visiting. Most, but not all, of these sessions are open to the public. Teachers can find out what is on the docket for the day they are planning to visit and request to bring students into the courtroom. Students should be prepared for the visit so that they understand it. Proper rules of decorum, including dress codes, must be followed if a class comes to observe a court session??"ask when arranging the visit.

Take a tour: Taking a tour of a courthouse can help students better understand court procedure and the jobs of those who work in the courts. Students will learn what happens behind the scenes??"information they don’t see on television court dramas. While students usually cannot visit judges’ chambers, they can tour a courtroom and talk to court personnel about how trials and hearings are conducted. If time permits, students may even be able to role play certain aspects of court procedure, such as voir dire, in the courtroom.

Talk with a judge or other personnel: Many judges will talk to students; however, judges have ethical guidelines that prohibit them from discussing cases that are pending or may come before them. Speaking personally to a judge can demystify the court experience for students, making them less fearful or suspicious of the legal process. Other participants in the legal process??"such as the clerk of court, the bailiff, the court reporter, or attorneys involved??"also may be willing to speak to students. Prosecutors and public defenders can help to illuminate the adversarial system. It is important that students be prepared for the interaction. Help them draft questions before and during the visit to ensure a productive learning experience.

How are visits set up?
Teachers who wish to take a class to court should call the court they want to visit to find out what services are available there to help students learn about the court system. Because the courts tend to be very busy, teachers should be prepared to allow several weeks of lead time when they are arranging a visit. Information about visiting courts is available by phone or online.

Whether the class is visiting a federal or state court, the personnel in the clerk’s office or court information office can help teachers select an appropriate date for a class visit and can even find out what cases are on the docket if students wish to observe a court session. These court offices also will provide important logistical information, such as parking locations and directions. Some questions you may want to ask when scheduling a trip include:
How many students may I bring to the court at one time?
Which days and times are best to bring students to the court?
What can my students do at the court?
If we come to see a specific case and it settles, is there a back-up activity?
What are the rules of decorum and dress the students must follow? (Generally, these include: no food or drink in the courtroom, no gum, no hats. There may be different rules for an individual court).
Are there any judges who would be willing to speak to students? Prosecutors? Public defenders? Other court personnel? How can I set up a meeting with them?

South Carolina Circuit Courts
http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/circuitcourt/circuitmap.cfm

To contact the county Circuit Courts, look in the government pages of the telephone directory or call South Carolina Court Administration at (803) 734-1800. The telephone numbers for the Clerk of Court Office in each county are also posted on the court system website at http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/circuitcourt/circuitmap.cfm

South Carolina Court of Appeals
www.sccourts.org/appeals
1015 Sumter Street
Columbia, SC 29201
(803) 734-1890

Tours of the South Carolina Court of Appeals, which is located in Columbia, can be arranged by calling the Court of Appeals' Clerk of Court's Office at (803)734-1890. Arrangements can be made to sit in on an oral argument while visiting the court.

South Carolina Supreme Court
www.sccourts.org/supreme
1231 Gervais Street
Columbia, SC 29201
(803) 734-1080

The South Carolina Supreme Court currently offers two programs for students - the Class Action Program and the Case of the Month (see Class Action Program listed later in listing). However, tours of the building are available at other times by calling the Supreme Court Clerk of Court's Office at (803) 734-1080.

Federal Courts in South Carolina (the Fourth Circuit)

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Aiken Division
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Aiken.asp
Charles E. Simmons, Jr. Federal Courthouse
223 Park Avenue, SW
Aiken, SC 29801
803-648-6896

The Aiken Division hears cases from Aiken, Allendale and Barnwell counties.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Anderson/Greenwood Division
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Anderson.asp
G. Ross Anderson, Jr. Federal Building and United States Courthouse
315 South McDuffie Street, 2nd Floor
Anderson, SC 29624

The Anderson/Greenwood Division hears cases from Anderson, Oconee, Pickens, Abbeville, Edgefield, Greenwood, McCormick, Newberry and Saluda Counties.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Beaufort Division
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Beaufort.asp
Beaufort Federal Courthouse
1501 Bay Street
Beaufort, SC 29902
843-521-2088

The Beaufort Division hears cases from Beaufort, Hampton and Jasper counties.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Charleston Division
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Charleston.asp
Charleston Federal Courthouse
85 Broad Street
Columbia, SC 29401
843-579-1401

The Charleston Division hears cases from Charleston, Berkeley, Clarendon, Colleton, Dorchester and Georgetown counties.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Columbia Division
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Columbia.asp
Matthew J. Perry, Jr. Courthouse
901 Richland Street
Columbia, SC 29201
803-765-5816

The Columbia Division hears cases from Richland, Kershaw, Lee, Lexington, and Sumter counties. In addition, the Rock Hill Division, which covers Chester, Fairfield, Lancaster and York counties, and the Orangeburg Division, which covers Bamberg, Calhoun and Orangeburg Counties, also hear cases at this courthouse.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Florence Division
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Florence.asp
McMillan Federal Building
401 West Evans Street
Florence, SC 29501
843-676-3820

The Florence Division hears cases from Chesterfield, Darlington, Dillon, Florence, Horry, Marion, Marlboro, and Williamsburg counties.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Greenville Division
Clement F. Haynsworth Federal Building
300 East Washington Street
Greenville, SC 29601
864-241-2700
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Greenville.asp

The Greenville Division hears cases from Greenville and Laurens counties.

U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, Spartanburg Division
Donald S. Russell Federal Building
201 Magnolia Street
Spartanburg, SC 29301
864-241-2711
www.scd.uscourts.gov/Court/Spartanburg.asp

The Spartanburg Division hears cases from Cherokee, Spartanburg and Union counties.

The best time to visit a court is during a unit on the judicial system or the rights that the system protects. In this context, students can put their new knowledge to use by observing and interpreting court sessions and finding out more information from judges and other court personnel. In particular, it may be helpful for students to learn about the structure, functions, and procedures of the court before visiting. If students are talking with court personnel, it is often helpful for them to prepare questions before visiting the court. Students can write questions that relate to information they already have learned about the courts, or satisfy their curiosity about an issue they may have seen in the media or other source. You may give students some guidance on their questions by providing models or steering them away from inappropriate questions about pending cases.

Teachers should reinforce learning from the court experience through continued classroom activities on the judicial system. Whenever possible, refer to what students learned while at the courts to help them make connections between the court and their classroom experiences.

It is also important to follow up with a note of thanks, preferably signed by the students, addressed to those who helped make the experience meaningful. Before leaving the court, be sure to get the names and addresses of those who set up the visit or spoke to the students.

Power is central to the stability and authority of any government. In the United States, there are several concepts involving power. Those concepts include expressed powers, implied powers, shared powers and separation of powers. Expressed powers are the powers enumerated or listed in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. Those powers include the power to declare war, levy taxes and regulate commerce among the states. Implied powers are those powers exercised by the government for which there is no actual or specific mention in the Constitution, but there is also no prohibition against the exercise of the power. An implied power is usually carried out under the authority of Article I, Section 8, paragraph eighteen of the Constitution, the necessary and proper clause, or is based on custom or has been acquired over time. Examples of an implied power would be the creation of an agency like the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), the ability of the legislature to issue subpoenas or the authority of the Supreme Court to exercise judicial review. A shared power is a power that both the federal and state governments can exercise, such as the power to levy taxes.

All of these concepts about power are important, but separation of power is a cornerstone of our constitutional system and the republican form of government that exists in the United States. Under the concept of separation of powers, no one branch or person can “aggrandize power and threaten individual liberties.” In its Dialogue on the Separation of Powers, the American Bar Association defines separation of powers as “. . . the idea that a government functions best when its powers as not concentrated in a single authority but are divided among different groups or branches.” The United States was the first nation to formally integrate separation of powers in the framework of the government with the adoption of the Constitution in 1787.

The concept of separation of powers developed during the Enlightenment period in the eighteenth century. Enlightenment thinkers like Baron de Montesquieu, David Hume and William Blackstone all contributed to the concept, but it was the framers of the Constitution that first put the idea or theory into practice. The framers sought to prevent, as much as possible, the abuse of power they felt existed in the pre-Revolutionary War government under the British. As they wrote the Constitution, the framers “drew their principles of government from a variety of sources and continually redefined those standards in the light of changing political conditions.” The principles included the idea of “mixed government” advocated by Plato and Aristotle, the idea of a balance of power that developed during the colonial period and the idea of multiple branches of government advocated by Montesquieu and other Enlightenment thinkers.

The existence of different branches of government is central to the separation of powers concept. There are three branches of government in the United States ??" executive, legislative, judicial ??" and they all exercise different powers. However, one should realize that the separation is not complete and distinct; there is overlap among the three branches that sometimes leads to controversy and challenge. Even when the controversy occurs, the separation of powers doctrine allows for peaceful solution through judicial review, Congressional hearings and executive privilege.

The Three Branches and Their Powers

The Enlightenment thinkers identified three areas where governments exercise power:

Legislative power - the power to make laws
Executive power - the power to enforce laws
Judicial power - the power to interpret laws
The founding fathers incorporated these three branches into the Constitution and attempted, as much as was possible, to enumerate the powers of the three branches. Article I of the Constitution provides the framework for the powers and structure of the legislative branch. The powers given to the legislative branch were listed in Section 8 of Article I. In eighteen separate statements or paragraphs, the founding fathers stipulated the powers of the legislative branch to include the ability to levy taxes, borrow money, coin money, regulate commerce and immigration, create a postal system, etc. Paragraph eighteen presents the “necessary and proper clause” in which the legislative branch was given the power to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying the powers enumerated in the preceding seventeen paragraphs.

Before proceeding to the executive and judicial branches, the founding fathers found it necessary to also prohibit certain powers to the federal legislative branch. The powers prohibited included the passage of ex post facto laws, the levying of export taxes and the granting of titles of nobility. In a similar fashion the authors of the Constitution prohibited the states from exercising certain powers as well, including the ability of the states to coin money, enter alliances with foreign nations, and pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts. The prohibition of these powers to both the federal and state government is important to the concept of separation of powers.

Article II of the Constitution focuses on the executive branch. As we know, the executive branch is embodied in the President. The President is commander-in-chief of the armed forces and has the power to nominate judges and ambassadors with the advice and consent of the Senate. The President can also negotiate treaties with foreign nations, though the treaties are not binding on the United States without ratification of the Senate. It is the responsibility of the president to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The powers of the judicial branch are outlined in Article III. According to Section 2 of Article III, “The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority. . . .” The power of judicial review, widely practiced by the judiciary today, is not granted expressly in the Constitution, but neither is it prohibited. The concept of judicial review was argued for in the Federalist Papers and exercised by the Supreme Court first in Hylton v. United States in 1796, in which a federal law was first upheld by the court, and then again in 1803 in Marbury v. Madison, when a federal law was found unconstitutional for the first time.

Part and partial to the concept of separation of powers is the system of checks and balances that exist in our system of government. Each branch has one or more checks on the other branches. The President can veto laws passed by Congress, but Congress can override the vetoes. The Senate can reject presidential appointees and treaties negotiated by the president, but they cannot reduce the compensation paid the President during his term in office. The President can appoint judges, but the judges serve for life (good behavior), so the President cannot remove a judge, only Congress can do that through impeachment. The Supreme Court can invalidate laws, but Congress can pass amendments to the Constitution that may address points of law previously found unconstitutional by the court. With these checks and balances, the founding fathers prevented, to a large degree, abuses of power by any one entity.

Despite the attempt to enumerate the powers of each branch and even stipulate the powers forbidden to the federal and/or state governments, there are points of contention among the branches. The issues presented below are but a few of the issues that exist in the concept of separation of powers.

The right to privacy is not specifically enumerated in the Constitution nor the Bill of Rights. However, in 1965, the Supreme Court opened the door to right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, a case which focused on marital rights, specifically the right of a couple to use contraceptive devices. Eight years later, in Roe v. Wade, the court expanded the right to include the right of a woman to terminate a pregnancy. Since that decision, discussion over the right to privacy and how far it extends has often been in the forefront of political campaigns and judicial appointments. The recent Supreme Court nominee confirmation hearings focused on the issue and many senators wanted the nominees to stipulate whether they would uphold or overturn Roe v. Wade. Many observers of the confirmation process worried that the demand of the senators that the nominees declare their viewpoint overstepped the separation of powers concept. Did the Supreme Court go too far? Only time will tell as a recently passed law in South Dakota prohibits almost all abortions. The law is sure to be challenged in the courts.

Another issue regarding the right to privacy surfaced in the spring of 2006 ??" the issue of the federal government (through the executive branch) listening in on phone conversations without a search warrant. The government also purchased phone records from some companies, an action considered an invasion of privacy by many. The explanation of the action by the executive branch was that the action was necessary to fight terrorism. This issue will most likely play out in the courts over the next few years.

Federalism has long been a battle ground in separation of powers. Just how much power does the federal government have to pass laws that affect its citizens? Concern over school safety led to the passage of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, making it a federal crime to have a gun in a school zone. But states have laws in this area, and the Supreme Court invalidated this law in United States v. Lopez, stating the law was outside the scope of the commerce clause of the Constitution. How far should the federal government go in combating guns in schools when education is usually considered the purview of the state?
Federalism comes into play when the federal government passes laws that threaten to withhold funds from states that do not comply. In the early 1980s the states were told to change the legal age for drinking alcohol to 21 or face the loss of federal highway funds. No Child Left Behind, the reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Schools Act in 2001, threatens to withhold Title I funding from states that do not improve educational achievement. Much is expected of the states, but little funding is given to implement the law, leading many people to argue that the law is an unfunded mandate, a popular complaint regarding federalism and separation of powers. But federalism has been an issue since the early days of the Constitution when the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves argued that states should be able to declare “null and void” laws they felt were unconstitutional. Over 200 years later the issue still remains, and will remain as long as we have a federal system of government where power is shared among different levels of government.

Privilege is usually known as “executive privilege” because most of the cases regarding this issue have involved the President arguing that papers and other records in the possession of the executive branch were privileged information and not subject to subpoena or public review. The most famous of the cases involving this issue of separation of powers is United States v. Nixon, 1974, stemming from the Watergate break-in. The court found against the President and stated that while executive privilege is important and should not be trampled on by the other branches, there are times when the right to know supersedes executive privilege. Nixon had to hand over the papers in question. President George W. Bush recently invoked executive privilege to prevent certain documents relating to his Supreme Court nominees from being released during their confirmation hearings.

Privilege recently came into the limelight for a different reason. In late May 2006, the FBI executed a search of the office of a member of the House of Representatives. The representative was under investigation for bribery, but until now the congressional offices of members of Congress were considered off limits to searches by the executive branch. Congress views the search as a breech of the separation of powers while the executive branch sees the issue as one of upholding the law. It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court will become involved in this case.

Another topic of interest today is the war powers arena. In 1973 Congress adopted the War Powers Act in response to the escalation of the Vietnam War without complete authorization of Congress. The resolution restricts the use of United States troops over a certain length of time without a formal declaration of war. The present war in Iraq and the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan have brought the issue back to the forefront of political and constitutional issues. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of the act, but if the wars continue, a challenge to the power of the President as the commander-in-chief may be in the near future.

In 2000 the Supreme Court was pulled into the election arena in the cases of Bush v. Gore. This election issue not only entered the realm of separation of powers in regards to state control of elections, it put the Supreme Court in the middle of choosing the President. While we all know the outcome of the case and the election, the nagging issue in regards to elections is how often will the courts be called upon in the future to decide elections? Every effort should be made to protect the concept of separation of powers in this area of everyday life.

There are numerous other issues that involve the separation of powers; these are only a few of the most recent and most volatile. As concerned citizens we should keep watch over excessive entanglement of one branch with the others.

The concept of separation of powers in the South Carolina state government has evolved in the last fifty years. Under the 1895 state constitution, three branches were established, and Article I, section 8 of that Constitution states: “In the government of this state, the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of the government, shall be forever separate and distinct from each other and no person or persons exercising the functions of one of said departments shall assume or discharge the duties of any other.” In actuality, the 1895 Constitution placed more power in the hands of the legislative branch than any other branch. The legislature elects the judges and justices for the state courts, and the judges and justices serve finite terms in office, then must be reelected. There are individuals who question whether the courts can truly carry out their function if judged fear the loss of their position if the find against the legislature on issues.

Another issue that has only recently been addressed is the power of the governor to appoint the heads of state agencies. For many years constitutional historians joked that South Carolina actually had four branches of government ??" the traditional legislative, executive and judicial branches ??" and a fourth branch made up of all of the state agencies that answered to no one in particular and whose leadership often fell to individual legislators. Beginning in the early 1970s a movement began to bring order and control to the state bureaucracy. In the early 1990s many of the state agencies were brought under the control of the executive branch. The governor now has the power to appoint the heads of many agencies, such as Commerce, Revenue, Public Safety and Corrections. However, other positions like Education and Agriculture remain elected positions and more often than not, the elected officials do not agree with the direction the governor wants to go on those two issues. Attempts to further create a cabinet under the executive branch have made little headway in recent years.

Today the judiciary remains elected by the legislature and concerns over the lack of election of African American and female candidates to the bench is becoming a volatile issue. Though the judiciary appears to operate outside the political pressures of reelections, as evidenced in the recent court case on the law governing the TERI system, there are still individuals who would like to see the judges elected to the bench like in North Carolina and other states. Appointment of judges for life appears to be a non-issue.

The separation of powers between the legislature and the governor is also a point of debate. The legislature has taken issue with the governor over what they believe is undue pressure on budget decisions, including the very recent discussion over whether the governor would call the legislature to come back for a special session to consider budget vetoes before the primary election, or whether the legislature would set the schedule. In the end the legislature notified the governor that they would not return until after the election whether the governor called a special session or not. This issue highlights the tension that exists between the legislative and executive branches o government in South Carolina.

Separation of powers in South Carolina is unique and at times difficult to understand. James Underwood summarizes the situation well.

. . . the principle of separation of powers as applied in South Carolina may appear to be functionally interchangeable with the operation of the doctrine in many other states and the federal government. However, despite the presence of significant similarities to the manner in which the separation of powers concept functions in other American jurisdictions, the South Carolina system of allocating power among the branches of the state government has taken a ruggedly independent course that has resulted in a unique adaption of the doctrine to its distinct traditions and needs.

The concept of separation of powers bears watching in South Carolina over the next few years as the roles of the various branches become more intertwined and as constitutional offices like Superintendent of Education or Secretary of State are considered for change from elected to appointed positions.

Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013): A non-Native American couple in South Carolina sought to adopt a young Cherokee girl over the objections of her Cherokee father who asserted his parental rights. The child was initially placed with the South Carolina family by the birth mother. The South Carolind Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the South Carolina Family Court which applied the Indian Child Welfare Act and transferred physical and legal custody of the child to her biological fatehr. By a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court decision and remanded the case for further hearings to determine who should have custody of Baby Girl. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act provisions on active efforts to prevent the breakup of a Native American family and heightened burden of proof for termination of parental rights did not apply to this private adoption proceeding. The United States Supreme Court also held that the section of the Indian Child Welfare Act that deals with adoptive placement preferences did not preclude adoption by prospective non-Native American adoptive parents where no individuals within the Act's placement preferences had formally sought to adopt the child. The child was ultimately adopted by the South Carolina couple. Full Case Materials

Update - Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 404 SC 490 (2013) (Reversing and remanding the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion by holding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) does not apply to a Native American biological father who is not the custodian of a Native American child. The Court held that the procedures required by ICWA to end parental rights do not apply when the child has never lived with the father. Additionally, ICWA's requirement to make extra efforts to preserve the Native American family does not apply nor is the preferred placement of the child in another Native American family required when no other party has formally sought to adopt the child).

Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 504, 178 L.E.2d 369 (2010) (whether an indigent defendant has a right to court-appointed counsel when faced with being sent to jail for violating a state court child support order).

Holmes v. State of South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (holding that a criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule under which the defendant may not introduce evidence of third party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict).

Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (holding that, unless an arbitration agreement stipulates otherwise, a court’s role is almost exclusively to adjudicate “the validity of the arbitration clause [and] its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties” and “[u]nder the terms of the parties’ contracts, the question--whether the agreement forbids class arbitration--is for the arbitrator to decide), vacating and remanding 351 S.C. 244, 569 S.E.2d 349 (2002).

Jinks v. Richland County, S.C., 538 U.S. 456 (2003) (holding that provision of supplemental jurisdiction statute tolling state statute of limitations while original lawsuit was pending in federal court was not unconstitutional), reversing and remanding 349 S.C. 298, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002).

Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (holding that: (1) defendant's future dangerousness was put “at issue” during sentencing phase by evidence of defendant's prison behavior combined with prosecutor's argument, triggering due process right to parole ineligibility instruction; (2) right to parole ineligibility instruction did not depend on jury's demonstrated confusion on that issue; and (3) right to parole ineligibility
instruction was not indirectly satisfied by defense counsel's comments concerning permanence of life sentence), reversing and remanding 343 S.C. 350, 540 S.E.2d 851 (2001).

Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (holding that when “a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel’”), reversing 340 S.C. 291, 531 S.E.2d 524 (2000).

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (Holding that involuntary urine test of pregnant women conducted by a hospital pursuant by a policy developed with law enforcement were unreasonable "searches" within the meaning of Fourth Amendment unless the patient consents).

Foster v. Gilliam, 515 U.S. 1301 (1995) (state not entitled to stay of District Court’s order granting habeas relief to extent that it enjoined resumption of state trial proceedings following mistrial).

Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (Where a defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits his release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible), reversing and remanding 310 S.C. 439, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993).

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (establishing categorical rule requiring compensation when a regulation permanently deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of his land), reversing and remanding 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).

Hilton v. S C Public Railways Com’n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991) (holding that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act created cause of action against state-owned railroad, enforceable in state court), reversing and remanding 306 S.C. 260, 411 S.E.2d 424 (1990).

Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (reiterating that proper harmless error standard is whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” An error does “not contribute to a verdict” only if it is unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.), reversing and remanding 301 S.C. 214, 391 S.E.2d 530 (1990).

Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (holding new rule, which stated that Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following suspect’s request for counsel in separate investigation, not applicable to collateral review of defendant’s conviction where it did not fall within either of two narrow exceptions to general rule of nonapplicability of new rules to cases on collateral review).

South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (holding that prosecutor engaged in improper argument during sentencing phase when he read at length from religious tract that victim was carrying and commented on personal qualities he inferred from victim’s possession of religious tract and voter registration card), affirming 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140 (1988).

Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (state trial court’s order directing petitioner not to consult his attorney during 15-minute afternoon recess did not violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel).

Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (holding that: (1) retroactive application of Francis v. Franklin to invalidate conviction due to improper burden-shifting instruction was appropriate, and (2) after considering merits of federal claim, the South Carolina Supreme Court could not refuse to apply the rule of federal constitutional law on the ground that it had authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings) (citation omitted), reversing and remanding 290 S.C. 231, 349 S.E.2d 84 (1986).

Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that exclusion from the sentencing hearing of testimony of jailers and a regular visitor, regarding petitioner’s good behavior during the seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial, deprived petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment), reversing and remanding 285 S.C. 42, 328 S.E.2d 58 (1985).

Lanier v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 25 (1985) (holding that the fact that a confession may be “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, in the sense that Miranda warnings were given and understood, is not by itself sufficient to purge the taint of illegal arrest; in such situation, a finding of “voluntariness” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis), vacating State v. Lanier, 85-MO-003 (S.C. App. filed February 14, 1985).

In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that engage in litigation as “a form of political expression” and “political association” constitutes expressive and associational conduct entitled to First Amendment protection, as to which government may regulate only “with narrow specificity”), reversing 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977).

Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a South Carolina statute that made certain benefits “available to all institutions of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not having a religious affiliation”), affirming 258 S.C. 97, 187 S.E.2d 645 (1972).

Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires trial judge, on voir dire, to interrogate jurors upon subject of racial prejudice after defendant's timely request), reversing 256 S.C. 1, 180 S.E.2d 628 (1971).

Heublein, Inc. v. S C Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275 (1972) (statute taxing net income derived from sales of liquor products within the state by foreign corporation, accomplished by requiring such corporation, after sending its products to a local representative in state, to then transfer products to local wholesaler, though the required activity involved more than mere solicitation of sales and thereby removed corporation’s protection under 15 U.S.C.A. § 381 from state income tax, did not violate § 381 or commerce clause.), affirming 257 S.C. 17, 183 S.E.2d 710 (1971).

Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places of public accommodation, including lunch counters engaged in interstate commerce, and removed peaceful attempts to be served on an equal basis from the category of punishable activities, even though the “sit-ins” occurred prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act), vacating 241 S.C. 420, 128 S.E.2d 907 (1962).

Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964) (holding that a peaceful “sit-in” demonstration at the Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia did not violate State “breach of peace” statute where evidence overwhelmingly indicated petitioners were polite, quiet, and peaceful), reversing and remanding 239 S.C. 395, 123 S.E.2d 521 (1961).

Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (holding that peaceful “sit-in” demonstrators at Eckerd’s drug store did not violate trespass statute and their convictions deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law), reversing 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962).

Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (holding that peaceful protest of segregation in front of city hall, while unpopular, was not prohibited by state law and breach of peace convictions were violative of the Fourteenth Amendment), reversing 244 S.C. 74, 135 S.E.2d 718 (1963).

Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that State could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to claimant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, who was terminated for refusing to work on Saturdays because of her religious beliefs), reversing and remanding 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).

Peterson v. City of Greenville, S. C., 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (holding that 10 black S. H. Kress store patrons who were arrested for refusing to leave the lunch counter were deprived of the equal protection of the laws in a “palpable violation” of the Fourteenth Amendment), reversing 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826 (1961).

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that the arrest, conviction, and punishment of black protestors marching peacefully on the sidewalk around the State House grounds to publicize their dissatis-faction with the State’s discriminatory policies, violated the protestors’ constitution-ally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances), reversing 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247 (1961).

Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (holding that South Carolina courts were not, under Full Faith and Credit Clause, precluded, by Virginia court’s dismissal of child custody case after parties had agreed as to custody of infant children involved, from determining best interest of the children and, accordingly, from entering a custody decree adverse to parties’ prior agreement in Virginia), reversing and remanding 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961)

Laurens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 365 U.S. 517 (1961) (holding that State documentary stamp taxes paid by a federal savings and loan association on notes it executed to a federal home loan bank were forbidden by Congress), reversing and remanding 236 S.C. 2, 112 S.E.2d 716 (1960).

U.S. v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (holding that where landlord had distressed upon corporate tenant’s assets for rent in arrears one day before receiver was appointed for the insolvent tenant, but months after Collector of Internal Revenue had received assessment lists for tenant’s nonpayment of taxes due, government liens for taxes attached before landlord had obtained distress warrant, and tax liens had priority over landlord's lien of distraint), reversing 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E.2d 277 (1953).

Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255 (1950) (holding that South Carolina state courts lacked the power to interpret a collective bargaining agreement because of provisions of the Railway Labor Act), reversing and remanding 215 S.C. 280, 54 S.E.2d 816 (1949).

Harris v. State of S.C., 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (reversing a murder conviction where a confession introduced at the trial was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause because the facts showed petitioner was not advised of his rights under state law and petitioner was interrogated by dozens of officers for virtually three days straight until police threatened to arrest petitioner’s mother), reversing 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682 (1948).

Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948) (holding that South Carolina cannot collect heavy statutory penalty fees on railroad corporations simply because those railroads are not owned and operated by South Carolina corporations where the federal railroad commission has granted the railroad power to operate in South Carolina), reversing and remanding 211 S.C. 122, 43 S.E.2d 839 (1947).

Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (negative implication from the commerce clause held not to place any limitation upon state power over the [insurance] business), affirming Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Murphy, 207 S.C. 324, 35 S.E.2d 586 (1945).

Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (reversing conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness minister who had no license to sell books, where the minister went from house to house distributing bibles for a “contribution,” because the ordinance requiring a license and fee violated the First Amendment), reversing 204 S.C. 337, 29 S.E.2d 539 (1943).

Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936) (holding that a South Carolina state court award of damages for delayed shipment of goods from Jacksonville, Florida to Charleston exceeded the penalty authorized by federal statute which governed such activity), reversing and remanding 181 S.C. 203, 186 S.E. 283 (1936).

Seabury v. Green, 294 U.S. 165 (1935) (holding that default bank’s creditors can take from the testator’s shares of stock, even though the devisees are minor children), reversing and remanding 173 S.C. 235, 175 S.E. 639 (1934).

Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (holding South Carolina court was precluded by Full Faith and Credit Clause from modifying a Georgia child support order which was non-modifiable under Georgia law), reversing 168 S.C. 46, 166 S.E. 877 (1932).

Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933) (statute suspending existing statutes applicable to liquidation of state banks, and regulations thereunder authorizing governor to appoint conservator, held not invalid as depriving depositor of property without due process, especially in view of later statute authorizing liquidation by conservator), affirming 171 S.C. 209, 172 S.E. 130 (1933).

Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933) (state may impose fee, as compensation for use of highways, on motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce), affirming 168 S.C. 440, 167 S.E. 674 (1933).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933) (state statutes, creating rebuttable presumption that failure to give crossing signals was proximate cause of crossing collision, held not violative of Commerce Clause of Constitution), affirming 169 S.C. 41, 168 S.E. 143 (1932).

Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932) (statute imposing tax on gasoline imported into state, and there placed in storage for future use, held not violative of equal protection clause, in view of similar tax on those buying or producing gas within state), affirming 166 S.C. 117, 164 S.E. 588 (1931).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Temple, 285 U.S. 143 (1932) (evidence, in action for locomotive engineer’s death when engine was derailed and overturned, held insufficient to take to jury defendant’s negligence in not properly spiking and bolting rail), reversing 165 S.C. 201, 163 S.E. 644 (1931).

Southern R. Co. v. Dantzler, 286 U.S. 318 (1932) (conductor’s disobedience of train dispatcher’s order to run locomotive on pass track at certain station and wait until freight train passed on main track held sole cause of his death in collision with such train beyond such station), reversing and remanding 166 S.C. 148, 164 S.E. 434 (1931).

Southern R. Co. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S. 313 (1932) (Conductor’s disobedience of train dispatcher’s order to run locomotive on pass track at certain station and wait until freight train passed on main track held sole cause of his death in collision with such train beyond such station), reversing and remanding 166 S.C. 140, 164 S.E. 431 (1931).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401 (1931) (in action for death of switchman brought into contact with semaphore, railroad held as matter of law not negligent in maintaining semaphore four feet and ten inches from outer edge of track), reversing 161 S.C. 122, 159 S.E. 473 (1930).

Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1 (1930) (South Carolina corporation’s indebtedness to nonresident stockholder for advances and dividends held not subject to South Carolina inheritance tax), reversing in part 162 S.C. 447, 160 S.E. 264 (1927).

Broad River Power Co. v. State of South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537 (1930) (stating that where the constitutional protection invoked in a particular case may be denied on state grounds, it is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to evaluate the merits of the state decision), affirming 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537 (1929).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Driggers, 279 U.S. 787 (1929) (speed of train on adjacent track held not proximate cause of injury to switchman, thrown against side of engine when he stepped off switch engine footboard), reversing 151 S.C. 164, 148 S.E. 889 (1928).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Davis, 279 U.S. 34 (1929) (railroad employee’s negligence in voluntarily taking position of obvious danger in “spotting” cars for loading by steam shovel barred recovery for death), reversing 150 S.C. 130, 147 S.E. 834 (1927).

Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. State of South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923) (though a state court may have construed a contract and placed its decision distinctly on its own construction, if it appears on examination that, in substance and effect, force has been given to a statute complained of as impairing the obligation of the contract, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court attaches), reversing 129 S. C. 68, 123 S. E. 646 (1921).

First Nat. Bank v. J.L. Mott Iron Works, 258 U.S. 240 (1922) (where a national bank to which a contractor had assigned the amounts to become due under the contract as security for advances made by the bank, guaranteed payment by the contractor for supplies furnished to enable him to complete the contract, and became entitled under its assignment to an amount exceeding the guaranteed purchase price, it is liable to pay the guaranteed price of the goods from which it has received a benefit in excess of its guaranty, even though its guaranty was invalid), affirming 131 S.C. 394, 103 S.E. 783 (1920).

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Poston, 256 U.S. 662 (1921) (under the joint resolution authorizing the President to take possession and control of any telegraph system, and the President’s proclamation taking such possession and control, a telegraph company is not liable under the common law for damages caused by negligent delay in the transmission of a message while its system was under the government control), reversing 107 S.E. 516 (1920).

La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) (a state may require that persons acting therein as insurance agents or brokers be licensed by a designated authority, and, subject to constitutional conditions and limitations, may prescribe the qualifications requisite for the granting of such license), affirming 104 S.C. 501, 89 S.E. 398 (1916).

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Lorick, 243 U.S. 572 (1917) (holding that that temporarily diverting a car or engine from its regular use for the purpose of making running repairs does not withdraw it from its interstate use or break the continuity of such use), affirming 102 S.C. 276, 86 S.E. 675 (1915).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917) (refusal of state court, upheld by highest court of state, to admit testimony in support of claim under federal Employers’ Liability Act, held not a denial of a federal right which the federal Supreme Court can review, where such claim was not asserted so as to call for its consideration by the highest state court.), dismissing appeal from 100 S.C. 375, 85 S.E. 372 (1915).

Carolina Glass Co. v. State of South Carolina, 240 U.S. 305 (1916) (the state’s immunity from suit by Eleventh Amendment prevents federal court from taking jurisdiction of a suit against individual members of the South Carolina Dispensary Commission to recover for moneys removed by them from county dispensaries under authority of a state statute), affirming 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910).

Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632 (1916) (whether the liability of an interstate carrier was changed to that of a warehouse-man under a local law casting the burden of proof upon a warehouseman in case of loss by fire, held a federal question supporting the appellate jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court over a state court), reversing 99 S.C. 422, 83 S.E. 781 (1914).

State of South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 63 (1915) (state’s power to accord to foreign corporations privilege of doing business within its borders upon such terms as it may prescribe imports broad authority to discriminate against such corporations both individually and collectively, upholding regulations of state requiring foreign insurance corporations to invest in state securities), affirming 94 S.C. 379, 77 S.E. 401 (1913).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Glenn, 239 U.S. 388 (1915) (no rights under Fourteenth Amendment are infringed by provisions of state statute under which any carrier participating in a through intrastate shipment may be sued for damages occurring on any part of the through route), affirming 96 S.C. 357, 80 S.E. 898 (1914).

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 352 (1915) (requiring trial of action for death of an interstate railway employee to proceed after amendment to complaint so as to specifically bring the case within Employers’ Liability Act held not an abuse of discretion amounting to a denial of due process of law guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment), affirming 101 S.C. 86, 85 S.E. 374 (1915).

Southern Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 239 U.S. 99 (1915) (presentation of mileage book by original purchaser, for transportation of another accompanying him, does not justify a forfeiture of the book under rule providing for forfeiture if presented by any other than original purchaser), affirming 94 S.C. 95, 77 S.E. 745 (1913).

Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (state statute imposing a penalty for failure to pay claims to a shipper within 40 days is preempted by Carmack Amendment), reversing 98 S.C. 63, 79 S.E. 700 (1913).

Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915) (change in punishment for murder, from death by hanging to electrocution, does not render the statute repugnant to U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 10, as an ex post facto law, when applied to crimes previously committed), affirming 95 S.C. 441, 78 S.E. 995 (1913).

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Padgett, 236 U.S. 668 (1915) (holding that sufficient jurisdiction existed in this federal Employers’ Liability Act case to warrant review), affirming 99 S.C. 364, 83 S.E. 633 (1914).

Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914) (holding that recovery of damages for mental anguish from the failure to deliver a telegram from Washington, D.C. to South Carolina, violates the interstate commerce clause), reversing 92 S.C. 354, 75 S.E. 542 (1912).

Southern Ry.-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80 (1914) (holding that in a federal Employers’ Liability Act action, appellate federal courts generally possess no revisory power as to allegations of excessive verdicts), affirming 98 S.C. 42, 79 S.E. 710 (1913).

Hopkins v. Clemson Agr. College of South Carolina, 221 U.S. 636 (1911) (holding that neither a state nor an individual could confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator), reversing and remanding 77 S.C. 12, 57 S.E. 551 (1907).

Franklin v. State of South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910) (no discrimination against blacks because of their race in the selection of the grand jury was made by a state statute giving jury commissioners the right to select electors of good moral character such as they might deem qualified to serve as jurors, being persons of sound judgment and free from all legal exceptions), affirming 80 S.C. 332, 60 S.E. 953 (1908).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U.S. 122 (1910) (provisions of state statutes imposing penalties for violation of regulations, as applied to interstate traffic, generally regarded as not constituting unlawful interference with interstate commerce and are therefore generally upheld, in so far as they are not in conflict with, or superseded by, federal legislation on the subject), affirming 58 S.E. 931 (1907).

Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U.S. 252 (1909) (decision of the highest court of a state upon question whether or not state statutes require claims for damages because of poor quality of material for purchase price of which a note was given to be set up in an action on the note, so as to be concluded by the judgment, is binding on the federal courts), affirming 77 S.C. 493, 58 S.E. 424 (1907).

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328 (1907) (any command of a state, whether made directly or through the instrumentality of a railroad commission, which orders, or the necessary effect of which is to order, the stopping of an interstate train at a named station or stations, if it directly regulates interstate commerce, is void as repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution), reversing Railroad Com’rs v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 71 S.C. 130, 50 S.E. 641 (1905) and 74 S.C. 80, 54 S.E. 224 (1906).

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73 (1907) (legislation imposing a penalty on common carriers for failure to adjust damage claims within forty days held to neither deny due process nor the equal protection of the law), affirming 73 S.C. 71, 52 S.E. 797 (1905).

Smith v. Jennings, 206 U.S. 276 (1907) (holding that review of the proceedings of a state legislature in the enactment of a state law and its conformity with the state constitution is not a federal question, and the determination of the state court and its judgment is final), dismissing appeal from 67 S.C. 324, 45 S.E. 821 (1903).

Western Elec. Supply Co. v. Abbeville Elec. Light & Power Co., 197 U.S. 299 (1905) (holding that no jurisdiction existed where federal questions were not raised until after final judgment was rendered by the South Carolina Supreme Court), dismissing appeal from 66 S.C. 328, 44 S.E. 952 (1902).

Southern Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U.S. 136 (1904) (holding that there was no error where the right of removal to federal court depends upon the act of Congress, and the defendant did not come within the act and made no effort to assert a right of removal in its pleadings), affirming 68 S.C. 55, 46 S.E. 525 (1903).

Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122 (1903) (holding that state courts do not take judicial notice of another state’s laws, rather they must be proved as facts in a case), affirming 62 S.C. 390, 38 S.E. 616 (1901)

Brownfield v. State of S.C., 189 U.S. 426 (1903) (holding that despite the fact that petitioner was convicted of murder by an all white jury, petitioner failed to do more than simply assert discrimination and so failed to properly raise a constitutional violation), affirming 60 S.C. 509, 39 S.E. 2 (1901).

Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Ebaugh, 185 U.S. 114 (1902) (holding that state courts do not take judicial notice of another state’s laws, rather they must be proved as facts in a case), affirming 58 S.C. 83, 36 S.E. 535 (1900).

Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Welling, 181 U.S. 47 (1901) (dismissing for failing to raise federal questions in state court until after the case had been heard by the S.C. Supreme Court), dismissing appeal from 56 S.C. 280, 34 S.E. 409 (1899).

Columbia Water-Power Co. v. Columbia Elec. Street-Railway, Light & Power Co., 172 U.S. 475 (1899) (holding that a sufficient federal question existed in this contract dispute between a private utility corporation and the state agency charged with establishing the city of Columbia’s utilities), affirming 43 S.C. 154, 20 S.E. 1002 (1895).

Charlotte, C. & A.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892) (holding that state law providing that all expenses of the state railroad commission be borne by the several corporations owning or operating railroads within the state, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision securing to every person the equal protection of the law), affirming 27 S.C. 385, 4 S.E. 49 (1887).

Blount v. Walker, 134 U.S. 607 (1890) (holding that no federal question existed in this probate action involving an alleged full faith and credit clause violation, where the state of South Carolina refused to adhere to a North Carolina probate court’s interpretation of S.C. law because the South Carolina decision was based on independent grounds), dismissing appeal from 28 S.C. 545 (1888).

Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U.S. 380 (1890) (holding that the state court’s decision in this contract dispute was founded on independent grounds, not involving a federal question) dismissing appeal from McLure v. Melton, 24 S.C. 559 (1886).

De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.S. 216 (1888) (holding that no federal question existed in this appeal regarding state taxes on state issued bonds because the state court’s decision was based on adequate and independent state grounds), dismissing appeal from Whaley v. Gaillard, 21 S.C. 560 (1884).

Stone v. State of South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430 (1886) (holding that there was no diversity jurisdiction in this suit by the state to recover against law firm partners despite the fact that one partner was a resident of New York state), affirming State v. Corbin & Stone, 16 S.C. 533 (1882).

Davis v. State of South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597 (1883) (holding that the state erred in proceeding in the prosecution of the petitioner, a soldier in the U.S. Army who accidentally shot a liquor distiller he was supposed to arrest, because petitioner was acting in his official capacity when he shot the fleeing victim and the case was removed to federal / military jurisdiction), reversing and remanding 12 S.C. 528 (1879).

State of South Carolina v. Stoll, 84 U.S. 425 (1873) (holding that former state law was impliedly repealed in part or wholly by later law only if harmony between the two laws was impossible), reversing 2 S.C. 538 (1871).