Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013): A non-Native American couple in South Carolina sought to adopt a young Cherokee girl over the objections of her Cherokee father who asserted his parental rights. The child was initially placed with the South Carolina family by the birth mother. The South Carolind Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the South Carolina Family Court which applied the Indian Child Welfare Act and transferred physical and legal custody of the child to her biological fatehr. By a 5-4 vote, the United States Supreme Court reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court decision and remanded the case for further hearings to determine who should have custody of Baby Girl. In so doing, the United States Supreme Court held that the Indian Child Welfare Act provisions on active efforts to prevent the breakup of a Native American family and heightened burden of proof for termination of parental rights did not apply to this private adoption proceeding. The United States Supreme Court also held that the section of the Indian Child Welfare Act that deals with adoptive placement preferences did not preclude adoption by prospective non-Native American adoptive parents where no individuals within the Act's placement preferences had formally sought to adopt the child. The child was ultimately adopted by the South Carolina couple. Full Case Materials
Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 504, 178 L.E.2d 369 (2010) (whether an indigent defendant has a right to court-appointed counsel when faced with being sent to jail for violating a state court child support order).
Holmes v. State of South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006) (holding that a criminal defendant’s federal constitutional rights are violated by an evidence rule under which the defendant may not introduce evidence of third party guilt if the prosecution has introduced forensic evidence that, if believed, strongly supports a guilty verdict).
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (holding that, unless an arbitration agreement stipulates otherwise, a court’s role is almost exclusively to adjudicate “the validity of the arbitration clause [and] its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties” and “[u]nder the terms of the parties’ contracts, the question--whether the agreement forbids class arbitration--is for the arbitrator to decide), vacating and remanding 351 S.C. 244, 569 S.E.2d 349 (2002).
Jinks v. Richland County, S.C., 538 U.S. 456 (2003) (holding that provision of supplemental jurisdiction statute tolling state statute of limitations while original lawsuit was pending in federal court was not unconstitutional), reversing and remanding 349 S.C. 298, 563 S.E.2d 104 (2002).
Kelly v. South Carolina, 534 U.S. 246 (2002) (holding that: (1) defendant's future dangerousness was put “at issue” during sentencing phase by evidence of defendant's prison behavior combined with prosecutor's argument, triggering due process right to parole ineligibility instruction; (2) right to parole ineligibility instruction did not depend on jury's demonstrated confusion on that issue; and (3) right to parole ineligibility
instruction was not indirectly satisfied by defense counsel's comments concerning permanence of life sentence), reversing and remanding 343 S.C. 350, 540 S.E.2d 851 (2001).
Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36 (2001) (holding that when “a capital defendant’s future dangerousness is at issue, and the only sentencing alternative to death available to the jury is life imprisonment without possibility of parole, due process entitles the defendant ‘to inform the jury of [his] parole ineligibility, either by a jury instruction or in arguments by counsel’”), reversing 340 S.C. 291, 531 S.E.2d 524 (2000).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (Holding that involuntary urine test of pregnant women conducted by a hospital pursuant by a policy developed with law enforcement were unreasonable "searches" within the meaning of Fourth Amendment unless the patient consents).
Foster v. Gilliam, 515 U.S. 1301 (1995) (state not entitled to stay of District Court’s order granting habeas relief to extent that it enjoined resumption of state trial proceedings following mistrial).
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (Where a defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits his release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible), reversing and remanding 310 S.C. 439, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993).
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (establishing categorical rule requiring compensation when a regulation permanently deprives an owner of “all economically beneficial uses” of his land), reversing and remanding 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
Hilton v. S C Public Railways Com’n, 502 U.S. 197 (1991) (holding that the Federal Employers’ Liability Act created cause of action against state-owned railroad, enforceable in state court), reversing and remanding 306 S.C. 260, 411 S.E.2d 424 (1990).
Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391 (1991) (reiterating that proper harmless error standard is whether it appears “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” An error does “not contribute to a verdict” only if it is unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.), reversing and remanding 301 S.C. 214, 391 S.E.2d 530 (1990).
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (holding new rule, which stated that Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following suspect’s request for counsel in separate investigation, not applicable to collateral review of defendant’s conviction where it did not fall within either of two narrow exceptions to general rule of nonapplicability of new rules to cases on collateral review).
South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989) (holding that prosecutor engaged in improper argument during sentencing phase when he read at length from religious tract that victim was carrying and commented on personal qualities he inferred from victim’s possession of religious tract and voter registration card), affirming 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140 (1988).
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) (state trial court’s order directing petitioner not to consult his attorney during 15-minute afternoon recess did not violate petitioner’s Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel).
Yates v. Aiken, 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (holding that: (1) retroactive application of Francis v. Franklin to invalidate conviction due to improper burden-shifting instruction was appropriate, and (2) after considering merits of federal claim, the South Carolina Supreme Court could not refuse to apply the rule of federal constitutional law on the ground that it had authority to establish the scope of its own habeas corpus proceedings) (citation omitted), reversing and remanding 290 S.C. 231, 349 S.E.2d 84 (1986).
Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that exclusion from the sentencing hearing of testimony of jailers and a regular visitor, regarding petitioner’s good behavior during the seven months he spent in jail awaiting trial, deprived petitioner of his right to place before the sentencer relevant evidence in mitigation of punishment), reversing and remanding 285 S.C. 42, 328 S.E.2d 58 (1985).
Lanier v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 25 (1985) (holding that the fact that a confession may be “voluntary” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, in the sense that Miranda warnings were given and understood, is not by itself sufficient to purge the taint of illegal arrest; in such situation, a finding of “voluntariness” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis), vacating State v. Lanier, 85-MO-003 (S.C. App. filed February 14, 1985).
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit organizations that engage in litigation as “a form of political expression” and “political association” constitutes expressive and associational conduct entitled to First Amendment protection, as to which government may regulate only “with narrow specificity”), reversing 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977).
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to a South Carolina statute that made certain benefits “available to all institutions of higher education in South Carolina, whether or not having a religious affiliation”), affirming 258 S.C. 97, 187 S.E.2d 645 (1972).
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment requires trial judge, on voir dire, to interrogate jurors upon subject of racial prejudice after defendant's timely request), reversing 256 S.C. 1, 180 S.E.2d 628 (1971).
Heublein, Inc. v. S C Tax Commission, 409 U.S. 275 (1972) (statute taxing net income derived from sales of liquor products within the state by foreign corporation, accomplished by requiring such corporation, after sending its products to a local representative in state, to then transfer products to local wholesaler, though the required activity involved more than mere solicitation of sales and thereby removed corporation’s protection under 15 U.S.C.A. § 381 from state income tax, did not violate § 381 or commerce clause.), affirming 257 S.C. 17, 183 S.E.2d 710 (1971).
Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964) (holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbids discrimination in places of public accommodation, including lunch counters engaged in interstate commerce, and removed peaceful attempts to be served on an equal basis from the category of punishable activities, even though the “sit-ins” occurred prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act), vacating 241 S.C. 420, 128 S.E.2d 907 (1962).
Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146 (1964) (holding that a peaceful “sit-in” demonstration at the Taylor Street Pharmacy in Columbia did not violate State “breach of peace” statute where evidence overwhelmingly indicated petitioners were polite, quiet, and peaceful), reversing and remanding 239 S.C. 395, 123 S.E.2d 521 (1961).
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964) (holding that peaceful “sit-in” demonstrators at Eckerd’s drug store did not violate trespass statute and their convictions deprived them of liberty and property without due process of law), reversing 239 S.C. 570, 124 S.E.2d 332 (1962).
Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964) (holding that peaceful protest of segregation in front of city hall, while unpopular, was not prohibited by state law and breach of peace convictions were violative of the Fourteenth Amendment), reversing 244 S.C. 74, 135 S.E.2d 718 (1963).
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that State could not constitutionally deny unemployment benefits to claimant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, who was terminated for refusing to work on Saturdays because of her religious beliefs), reversing and remanding 240 S.C. 286, 125 S.E.2d 737 (1962).
Peterson v. City of Greenville, S. C., 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (holding that 10 black S. H. Kress store patrons who were arrested for refusing to leave the lunch counter were deprived of the equal protection of the laws in a “palpable violation” of the Fourteenth Amendment), reversing 239 S.C. 298, 122 S.E.2d 826 (1961).
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding that the arrest, conviction, and punishment of black protestors marching peacefully on the sidewalk around the State House grounds to publicize their dissatis-faction with the State’s discriminatory policies, violated the protestors’ constitution-ally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances), reversing 239 S.C. 339, 123 S.E.2d 247 (1961).
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962) (holding that South Carolina courts were not, under Full Faith and Credit Clause, precluded, by Virginia court’s dismissal of child custody case after parties had agreed as to custody of infant children involved, from determining best interest of the children and, accordingly, from entering a custody decree adverse to parties’ prior agreement in Virginia), reversing and remanding 239 S.C. 305, 123 S.E.2d 33 (1961)
Laurens Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 365 U.S. 517 (1961) (holding that State documentary stamp taxes paid by a federal savings and loan association on notes it executed to a federal home loan bank were forbidden by Congress), reversing and remanding 236 S.C. 2, 112 S.E.2d 716 (1960).
U.S. v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955) (holding that where landlord had distressed upon corporate tenant’s assets for rent in arrears one day before receiver was appointed for the insolvent tenant, but months after Collector of Internal Revenue had received assessment lists for tenant’s nonpayment of taxes due, government liens for taxes attached before landlord had obtained distress warrant, and tax liens had priority over landlord's lien of distraint), reversing 224 S.C. 233, 78 S.E.2d 277 (1953).
Order of Ry. Conductors of America v. Southern Ry. Co., 339 U.S. 255 (1950) (holding that South Carolina state courts lacked the power to interpret a collective bargaining agreement because of provisions of the Railway Labor Act), reversing and remanding 215 S.C. 280, 54 S.E.2d 816 (1949).
Harris v. State of S.C., 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (reversing a murder conviction where a confession introduced at the trial was obtained in violation of the Due Process Clause because the facts showed petitioner was not advised of his rights under state law and petitioner was interrogated by dozens of officers for virtually three days straight until police threatened to arrest petitioner’s mother), reversing 212 S.C. 124, 46 S.E.2d 682 (1948).
Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. Daniel, 333 U.S. 118 (1948) (holding that South Carolina cannot collect heavy statutory penalty fees on railroad corporations simply because those railroads are not owned and operated by South Carolina corporations where the federal railroad commission has granted the railroad power to operate in South Carolina), reversing and remanding 211 S.C. 122, 43 S.E.2d 839 (1947).
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (negative implication from the commerce clause held not to place any limitation upon state power over the [insurance] business), affirming Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Murphy, 207 S.C. 324, 35 S.E.2d 586 (1945).
Follett v. Town of McCormick, S.C., 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (reversing conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness minister who had no license to sell books, where the minister went from house to house distributing bibles for a “contribution,” because the ordinance requiring a license and fee violated the First Amendment), reversing 204 S.C. 337, 29 S.E.2d 539 (1943).
Southeastern Express Co. v. Pastime Amusement Co., 299 U.S. 28 (1936) (holding that a South Carolina state court award of damages for delayed shipment of goods from Jacksonville, Florida to Charleston exceeded the penalty authorized by federal statute which governed such activity), reversing and remanding 181 S.C. 203, 186 S.E. 283 (1936).
Seabury v. Green, 294 U.S. 165 (1935) (holding that default bank’s creditors can take from the testator’s shares of stock, even though the devisees are minor children), reversing and remanding 173 S.C. 235, 175 S.E. 639 (1934).
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (holding South Carolina court was precluded by Full Faith and Credit Clause from modifying a Georgia child support order which was non-modifiable under Georgia law), reversing 168 S.C. 46, 166 S.E. 877 (1932).
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (1933) (statute suspending existing statutes applicable to liquidation of state banks, and regulations thereunder authorizing governor to appoint conservator, held not invalid as depriving depositor of property without due process, especially in view of later statute authorizing liquidation by conservator), affirming 171 S.C. 209, 172 S.E. 130 (1933).
Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U.S. 169 (1933) (state may impose fee, as compensation for use of highways, on motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce), affirming 168 S.C. 440, 167 S.E. 674 (1933).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ford, 287 U.S. 502 (1933) (state statutes, creating rebuttable presumption that failure to give crossing signals was proximate cause of crossing collision, held not violative of Commerce Clause of Constitution), affirming 169 S.C. 41, 168 S.E. 143 (1932).
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472 (1932) (statute imposing tax on gasoline imported into state, and there placed in storage for future use, held not violative of equal protection clause, in view of similar tax on those buying or producing gas within state), affirming 166 S.C. 117, 164 S.E. 588 (1931).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Temple, 285 U.S. 143 (1932) (evidence, in action for locomotive engineer’s death when engine was derailed and overturned, held insufficient to take to jury defendant’s negligence in not properly spiking and bolting rail), reversing 165 S.C. 201, 163 S.E. 644 (1931).
Southern R. Co. v. Dantzler, 286 U.S. 318 (1932) (conductor’s disobedience of train dispatcher’s order to run locomotive on pass track at certain station and wait until freight train passed on main track held sole cause of his death in collision with such train beyond such station), reversing and remanding 166 S.C. 148, 164 S.E. 434 (1931).
Southern R. Co. v. Youngblood, 286 U.S. 313 (1932) (Conductor’s disobedience of train dispatcher’s order to run locomotive on pass track at certain station and wait until freight train passed on main track held sole cause of his death in collision with such train beyond such station), reversing and remanding 166 S.C. 140, 164 S.E. 431 (1931).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Powe, 283 U.S. 401 (1931) (in action for death of switchman brought into contact with semaphore, railroad held as matter of law not negligent in maintaining semaphore four feet and ten inches from outer edge of track), reversing 161 S.C. 122, 159 S.E. 473 (1930).
Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1 (1930) (South Carolina corporation’s indebtedness to nonresident stockholder for advances and dividends held not subject to South Carolina inheritance tax), reversing in part 162 S.C. 447, 160 S.E. 264 (1927).
Broad River Power Co. v. State of South Carolina ex rel. Daniel, 281 U.S. 537 (1930) (stating that where the constitutional protection invoked in a particular case may be denied on state grounds, it is within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to evaluate the merits of the state decision), affirming 157 S.C. 1, 153 S.E. 537 (1929).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Driggers, 279 U.S. 787 (1929) (speed of train on adjacent track held not proximate cause of injury to switchman, thrown against side of engine when he stepped off switch engine footboard), reversing 151 S.C. 164, 148 S.E. 889 (1928).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Davis, 279 U.S. 34 (1929) (railroad employee’s negligence in voluntarily taking position of obvious danger in “spotting” cars for loading by steam shovel barred recovery for death), reversing 150 S.C. 130, 147 S.E. 834 (1927).
Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v. State of South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923) (though a state court may have construed a contract and placed its decision distinctly on its own construction, if it appears on examination that, in substance and effect, force has been given to a statute complained of as impairing the obligation of the contract, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court attaches), reversing 129 S. C. 68, 123 S. E. 646 (1921).
First Nat. Bank v. J.L. Mott Iron Works, 258 U.S. 240 (1922) (where a national bank to which a contractor had assigned the amounts to become due under the contract as security for advances made by the bank, guaranteed payment by the contractor for supplies furnished to enable him to complete the contract, and became entitled under its assignment to an amount exceeding the guaranteed purchase price, it is liable to pay the guaranteed price of the goods from which it has received a benefit in excess of its guaranty, even though its guaranty was invalid), affirming 131 S.C. 394, 103 S.E. 783 (1920).
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Poston, 256 U.S. 662 (1921) (under the joint resolution authorizing the President to take possession and control of any telegraph system, and the President’s proclamation taking such possession and control, a telegraph company is not liable under the common law for damages caused by negligent delay in the transmission of a message while its system was under the government control), reversing 107 S.E. 516 (1920).
La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919) (a state may require that persons acting therein as insurance agents or brokers be licensed by a designated authority, and, subject to constitutional conditions and limitations, may prescribe the qualifications requisite for the granting of such license), affirming 104 S.C. 501, 89 S.E. 398 (1916).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Lorick, 243 U.S. 572 (1917) (holding that that temporarily diverting a car or engine from its regular use for the purpose of making running repairs does not withdraw it from its interstate use or break the continuity of such use), affirming 102 S.C. 276, 86 S.E. 675 (1915).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917) (refusal of state court, upheld by highest court of state, to admit testimony in support of claim under federal Employers’ Liability Act, held not a denial of a federal right which the federal Supreme Court can review, where such claim was not asserted so as to call for its consideration by the highest state court.), dismissing appeal from 100 S.C. 375, 85 S.E. 372 (1915).
Carolina Glass Co. v. State of South Carolina, 240 U.S. 305 (1916) (the state’s immunity from suit by Eleventh Amendment prevents federal court from taking jurisdiction of a suit against individual members of the South Carolina Dispensary Commission to recover for moneys removed by them from county dispensaries under authority of a state statute), affirming 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910).
Southern Ry. Co. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632 (1916) (whether the liability of an interstate carrier was changed to that of a warehouse-man under a local law casting the burden of proof upon a warehouseman in case of loss by fire, held a federal question supporting the appellate jurisdiction of the federal Supreme Court over a state court), reversing 99 S.C. 422, 83 S.E. 781 (1914).
State of South Carolina ex rel. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. McMaster, 237 U.S. 63 (1915) (state’s power to accord to foreign corporations privilege of doing business within its borders upon such terms as it may prescribe imports broad authority to discriminate against such corporations both individually and collectively, upholding regulations of state requiring foreign insurance corporations to invest in state securities), affirming 94 S.C. 379, 77 S.E. 401 (1913).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Glenn, 239 U.S. 388 (1915) (no rights under Fourteenth Amendment are infringed by provisions of state statute under which any carrier participating in a through intrastate shipment may be sued for damages occurring on any part of the through route), affirming 96 S.C. 357, 80 S.E. 898 (1914).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Koennecke, 239 U.S. 352 (1915) (requiring trial of action for death of an interstate railway employee to proceed after amendment to complaint so as to specifically bring the case within Employers’ Liability Act held not an abuse of discretion amounting to a denial of due process of law guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment), affirming 101 S.C. 86, 85 S.E. 374 (1915).
Southern Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 239 U.S. 99 (1915) (presentation of mileage book by original purchaser, for transportation of another accompanying him, does not justify a forfeiture of the book under rule providing for forfeiture if presented by any other than original purchaser), affirming 94 S.C. 95, 77 S.E. 745 (1913).
Charleston & W.C. Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (state statute imposing a penalty for failure to pay claims to a shipper within 40 days is preempted by Carmack Amendment), reversing 98 S.C. 63, 79 S.E. 700 (1913).
Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180 (1915) (change in punishment for murder, from death by hanging to electrocution, does not render the statute repugnant to U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 10, as an ex post facto law, when applied to crimes previously committed), affirming 95 S.C. 441, 78 S.E. 995 (1913).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Padgett, 236 U.S. 668 (1915) (holding that sufficient jurisdiction existed in this federal Employers’ Liability Act case to warrant review), affirming 99 S.C. 364, 83 S.E. 633 (1914).
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914) (holding that recovery of damages for mental anguish from the failure to deliver a telegram from Washington, D.C. to South Carolina, violates the interstate commerce clause), reversing 92 S.C. 354, 75 S.E. 542 (1912).
Southern Ry.-Carolina Division v. Bennett, 233 U.S. 80 (1914) (holding that in a federal Employers’ Liability Act action, appellate federal courts generally possess no revisory power as to allegations of excessive verdicts), affirming 98 S.C. 42, 79 S.E. 710 (1913).
Hopkins v. Clemson Agr. College of South Carolina, 221 U.S. 636 (1911) (holding that neither a state nor an individual could confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort, so as to excuse the perpetrator), reversing and remanding 77 S.C. 12, 57 S.E. 551 (1907).
Franklin v. State of South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910) (no discrimination against blacks because of their race in the selection of the grand jury was made by a state statute giving jury commissioners the right to select electors of good moral character such as they might deem qualified to serve as jurors, being persons of sound judgment and free from all legal exceptions), affirming 80 S.C. 332, 60 S.E. 953 (1908).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Mazursky, 216 U.S. 122 (1910) (provisions of state statutes imposing penalties for violation of regulations, as applied to interstate traffic, generally regarded as not constituting unlawful interference with interstate commerce and are therefore generally upheld, in so far as they are not in conflict with, or superseded by, federal legislation on the subject), affirming 58 S.E. 931 (1907).
Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Kirven, 215 U.S. 252 (1909) (decision of the highest court of a state upon question whether or not state statutes require claims for damages because of poor quality of material for purchase price of which a note was given to be set up in an action on the note, so as to be concluded by the judgment, is binding on the federal courts), affirming 77 S.C. 493, 58 S.E. 424 (1907).
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328 (1907) (any command of a state, whether made directly or through the instrumentality of a railroad commission, which orders, or the necessary effect of which is to order, the stopping of an interstate train at a named station or stations, if it directly regulates interstate commerce, is void as repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution), reversing Railroad Com’rs v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 71 S.C. 130, 50 S.E. 641 (1905) and 74 S.C. 80, 54 S.E. 224 (1906).
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73 (1907) (legislation imposing a penalty on common carriers for failure to adjust damage claims within forty days held to neither deny due process nor the equal protection of the law), affirming 73 S.C. 71, 52 S.E. 797 (1905).
Smith v. Jennings, 206 U.S. 276 (1907) (holding that review of the proceedings of a state legislature in the enactment of a state law and its conformity with the state constitution is not a federal question, and the determination of the state court and its judgment is final), dismissing appeal from 67 S.C. 324, 45 S.E. 821 (1903).
Western Elec. Supply Co. v. Abbeville Elec. Light & Power Co., 197 U.S. 299 (1905) (holding that no jurisdiction existed where federal questions were not raised until after final judgment was rendered by the South Carolina Supreme Court), dismissing appeal from 66 S.C. 328, 44 S.E. 952 (1902).
Southern Ry. Co. v. Carson, 194 U.S. 136 (1904) (holding that there was no error where the right of removal to federal court depends upon the act of Congress, and the defendant did not come within the act and made no effort to assert a right of removal in its pleadings), affirming 68 S.C. 55, 46 S.E. 525 (1903).
Eastern Building & Loan Ass'n v. Williamson, 189 U.S. 122 (1903) (holding that state courts do not take judicial notice of another state’s laws, rather they must be proved as facts in a case), affirming 62 S.C. 390, 38 S.E. 616 (1901)
Brownfield v. State of S.C., 189 U.S. 426 (1903) (holding that despite the fact that petitioner was convicted of murder by an all white jury, petitioner failed to do more than simply assert discrimination and so failed to properly raise a constitutional violation), affirming 60 S.C. 509, 39 S.E. 2 (1901).
Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Ebaugh, 185 U.S. 114 (1902) (holding that state courts do not take judicial notice of another state’s laws, rather they must be proved as facts in a case), affirming 58 S.C. 83, 36 S.E. 535 (1900).
Eastern Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Welling, 181 U.S. 47 (1901) (dismissing for failing to raise federal questions in state court until after the case had been heard by the S.C. Supreme Court), dismissing appeal from 56 S.C. 280, 34 S.E. 409 (1899).
Columbia Water-Power Co. v. Columbia Elec. Street-Railway, Light & Power Co., 172 U.S. 475 (1899) (holding that a sufficient federal question existed in this contract dispute between a private utility corporation and the state agency charged with establishing the city of Columbia’s utilities), affirming 43 S.C. 154, 20 S.E. 1002 (1895).
Charlotte, C. & A.R. Co. v. Gibbes, 142 U.S. 386 (1892) (holding that state law providing that all expenses of the state railroad commission be borne by the several corporations owning or operating railroads within the state, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment’s provision securing to every person the equal protection of the law), affirming 27 S.C. 385, 4 S.E. 49 (1887).
Blount v. Walker, 134 U.S. 607 (1890) (holding that no federal question existed in this probate action involving an alleged full faith and credit clause violation, where the state of South Carolina refused to adhere to a North Carolina probate court’s interpretation of S.C. law because the South Carolina decision was based on independent grounds), dismissing appeal from 28 S.C. 545 (1888).
Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U.S. 380 (1890) (holding that the state court’s decision in this contract dispute was founded on independent grounds, not involving a federal question) dismissing appeal from McLure v. Melton, 24 S.C. 559 (1886).
De Saussure v. Gaillard, 127 U.S. 216 (1888) (holding that no federal question existed in this appeal regarding state taxes on state issued bonds because the state court’s decision was based on adequate and independent state grounds), dismissing appeal from Whaley v. Gaillard, 21 S.C. 560 (1884).
Stone v. State of South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430 (1886) (holding that there was no diversity jurisdiction in this suit by the state to recover against law firm partners despite the fact that one partner was a resident of New York state), affirming State v. Corbin & Stone, 16 S.C. 533 (1882).
Davis v. State of South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597 (1883) (holding that the state erred in proceeding in the prosecution of the petitioner, a soldier in the U.S. Army who accidentally shot a liquor distiller he was supposed to arrest, because petitioner was acting in his official capacity when he shot the fleeing victim and the case was removed to federal / military jurisdiction), reversing and remanding 12 S.C. 528 (1879).
State of South Carolina v. Stoll, 84 U.S. 425 (1873) (holding that former state law was impliedly repealed in part or wholly by later law only if harmony between the two laws was impossible), reversing 2 S.C. 538 (1871).